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THE NEW PUBLIC DOMAIN 
 
By Joseph P. Liu
*
 
 
Abstract 
 
In 1998, Congress extended the term of copyright protection, giving existing copyrighted works an 
additional 20 years of protection. The practical result was to freeze copyright’s public domain for a 
period of 20 years. Unless Congress extends the copyright term again, copyrighted works will start 
passing into the public domain in 2019, after a 20 year hiatus. This Article takes a look at some of 
the issues that will arise when this happens. It argues that the works passing into the public domain 
post 2018 differ dramatically, and in ways not yet fully appreciated, from the works that comprised 
the public domain prior to 1998. In addition, dramatic economic, technological, and cultural 
changes in the past 10 years mean that these new works will enter a vastly changed environment, 
one poised to make even greater and more immediate use of these works. Together, these develop-
ments hold out the possibility that this “new public domain” will in the future play a more vital and 
important role in our cultural landscape than ever before. At the same time, this Article highlights 
a number of legal issues that may keep the new public domain from fulfilling this promise. Owners 
of expiring copyrights will attempt to use a number of doctrines in trademark and copyright law to 
limit the free use of these works even after they have passed into the public domain. This Article 
concludes by proposing a number of concrete steps that can be taken to ensure that the public do-
main lives up to its promise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1998, Congress extended the length of the copyright term by an additional 20 years, apply-
ing this extension to both existing and future works. The practical effect of this term extension 
was to freeze copyright’s published public domain1 for a period of 20 years.2 Prior to 1998, copy-
righted works from the late 1910s and early 1920s had been passing into the public domain at a 
steady rate every year. After the term extension, however, the public domain for published works 
in the U.S. was effectively frozen. Thus, since 1998, no published copyrighted works have passed 
into the public domain. 
This freeze is about to come to an end. On January 1, 2019, copyrighted works first published 
in the U.S. in 1923 will pass into the public domain. For each year after 2019, another year’s 
worth of works published after 1923 will enter the public domain. Thus, unless Congress extends 
copyright once again, we can soon expect a number of important creative works to be available 
for others to freely copy, distribute, sell, and incorporate into new creative works. These include 
important musical works (such as songs by George Gershwin and Irving Berlin), literary works 
(such as novels by William Faulkner, Ernest Hemingway, Virginia Woolf), iconic visual works 
(such as visual depictions of Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, Winnie the Pooh, and Superman), and 
classic movies (such as Gone With the Wind and The Wizard of Oz). 
It is possible that the passing of these works into the public domain will raise few legal is-
sues. After all, copyright’s public domain existed for more than 200 years in the U.S. prior to 
1998.
3
 Ever since the very first copyright act in 1790, works had been passing into the public do-
main with regularity. And indeed, this is not the first time that the public domain has been tempo-
rarily frozen. Similar freezes occurred in the past when Congress passed prior retroactive copy-
right term extensions. Thus, we might expect the public domain in 2019 to easily and comfortably 
resume its place within the broad framework of copyright law and the industries that rely upon it. 
This Article argues that this is too facile a view and that the ―new public domain‖ will in fact 
differ in important ways from the public domain that existed before the term extension. One rea-
son has to do with the nature of the works that will pass into the public domain post 2018. Alt-
hough many important works passed into the public domain prior to 1998, the works that we can 
expect to pass into the public domain post 2018 are some of the most iconic and important Amer-
ican cultural works, encompassing the artistically rich decades of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. 
These decades coincide with dramatic changes in technology, which led to the rise of the record-
ed music, radio, and motion picture industries. The new public domain will, for the first time, 
contain works that were distributed to the public in mass recorded form. Thus, the scale and na-
ture of the new public domain will differ significantly from the old public domain, in ways that 
have yet to be fully appreciated. 
In addition, dramatic technological, economic, and cultural changes since 1998 mean that 
these new public domain works will enter a vastly changed environment, one poised to make 
even greater use of these works than ever before. New digital technologies have revolutionized 
the distribution and consumption of copyrighted works. The old economic models supporting the 
                                                 
1
 This Article uses the term ―public domain‖ in a limited fashion to refer to creative works that are not sub-
ject to copyright protection, whether because they were never eligible for protection or because their copy-
right terms have expired. For alternative definitions of the term, see infra text accompanying note __. 
2
 This freeze applies only to the expiration of copyrights in published works. In 2003, a large number of 
unpublished works passed into the public domain. See R. Anthony Reese, Public But Private: Copyright's 
New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585  (2007); Elizabeth Townsend Gard, January 1, 
2003: The Birth Of The Unpublished Public Domain And Its International Implications, 24 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 687 (2006). 
3
 Although it may not have been expressly called the ―public domain.‖ See Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and 
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002) (term ―public domain‖ imported from 
French law at the end of the 19
th
 century). 
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copyright industries have come under enormous pressure. Consumers are more able than ever to 
manipulate and work with copyrighted works to make their own creative works. Thus, the envi-
ronment that these new and important public domain works will enter bears little resemblance to 
the environment that existed prior to the freeze. 
This new public domain faces new perils and opportunities. The battle over the term exten-
sion focused much scholarly attention on the importance of the public domain. As a result of the 
term extension debate, we now have a more complete and richer account of the role that the pub-
lic domain has played, and can potentially play, in copyright law. This, coupled with the richness 
of the works that are about to enter the public domain, presents the potential for the public do-
main to play an even more vital role in the copyright balance and in our cultural landscape more 
generally. More specifically, as I will argue in this Article, the new public domain holds out the 
possibility that we will soon have a tremendously rich repository of important and iconic cultural 
works, which an unprecedentedly wide range of individuals, empowered by new technologies, 
will be able to freely access, share, re-cast, and transform, thereby creating a richer and more 
complex culture. 
Yet this new public domain faces challenges that may limit its potential. As an initial matter, 
there is the danger of an additional retroactive extension of the copyright term. But even if the 
copyright term is not extended, copyright owners will seek alternative legal mechanisms to pro-
tect their works and limit free use, even after the works have passed into the public domain. Spe-
cifically, copyright owners will look to trademark law and to other copyright law doctrines in an 
attempt to limit the ability of others to use their works. Although some of these issues have been 
addressed in existing case law, the scale and significance of the new public domain will put in-
creasing pressure on uncertainties in current doctrine and raise novel legal issues. Careful atten-
tion will therefore need to be paid in order to ensure that the new public domain fulfills its prom-
ise.  
This Article is an effort to comprehensively anticipate and analyze the implications of the 
new public domain. Part I begins with a description of the current state of affairs and how we got 
here. It recounts the initial battle over the copyright term extension in 1998 and the consequences 
of the extension. Part II addresses what will happen if the term is not extended and works begin 
passing into the public domain again in 2019. It argues that this new public domain differs from 
the old public domain in important ways. It describes, in detail, the nature of the works that will 
soon be passing into the public domain and how they differ qualitatively from the works that 
passed into the public domain before 1998. It also describes the dramatically new technological, 
economic, and cultural environment that awaits these works.  
Part III begins exploring the role that the new public domain can potentially play in the fu-
ture, as an important part of the copyright law balance. It describes the burgeoning scholarship 
about the public domain that flourished in the wake of the term extension. It also discusses how 
the works that will soon pass into the public domain can play a critical role in setting the future 
copyright balance. Part IV then comprehensively addresses a number of important legal issues 
that will need to be clarified in order for the new public domain to play this role. In particular, 
this Part addresses various problems resulting from overlapping copyright and trademark rights. 
In each of these areas, this Part offers concrete proposals for addressing these problems. 
When the copyright term was extended in 1998, the extension was viewed as a major setback 
by those who believed in the cultural benefits of a vibrant public domain. Yet this Article argues 
that, once works begin passing into the public domain again in 2019, the public domain has the 
potential to play an even more significant role than it ever did before the term extension. This 
Article thus ultimately holds out the hope that, with some careful attention, a new and even more 
robust public domain can potentially emerge from what was initially viewed as a bitter defeat. 
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I. THE FREEZING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
 
A. The Copyright Term Extension 
 
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to grant copyrights for ―limited Times,‖4 and 
every copyright act enacted under this provision has included a limited copyright term. The initial 
copyright term under the very first copyright act in 1790 granted authors an initial 14-year term of 
protection, which could be renewed for an additional 14 years.
5
 Thus, after a maximum of 28 
years, the copyright would expire and the work would pass into the public domain. This meant 
that others could then freely make and sell copies of that work without permission from the copy-
right owner. 
The limited term of copyright reflects a balance of competing interests. On the one hand, 
copyright grants exclusive rights to authors to give them an incentive to create the work and as a 
reward for their creative labor. On the other hand, once a work is created, we want that work to be 
broadly disseminated, since this is, after all, the broader purpose of copyright. In addition, we 
want others to be able to build upon these works to create new works.  
The limited copyright term is one way to balance these competing interests. The copyright 
term gives authors a certain amount of protection, sufficient to induce them to create the work 
and reward them for it. After the term has run out, the work passes into the public domain, where 
it can be freely disseminated and built upon by others. It becomes part of our common cultural 
heritage. 
Precisely where the balance should be struck is a matter that the Constitution leaves largely to 
Congress, and Congress has, over the last several centuries, steadily increased the term of copy-
right protection. As mentioned earlier, the initial copyright term in 1790 was 14 years from publi-
cation, with an additional 14 year renewal term, for a total maximum term of 28 years. In 1831, 
Congress increased the maximum term to 42 years,
6
 and then to 56 years in 1909.
7
 In the major 
1976 revision of the Act, the maximum term for existing works was extended to 75 years from 
publication.
8
 For works created after the effective date of the 1976 Act, the term was the life of 
the author plus an additional 50 years. 
Most recently in 1998, Congress once again extended the copyright term, this time by an ad-
ditional 20 years.
9
 Thus, for copyrighted works created prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act, 
copyright would now last for a maximum of 95 years from the date of publication. For works cre-
ated after the 1976 Act, copyright would now last for the life of the author plus an additional 70 
years. 
The passage of the most recent copyright term extension in 1998 touched off a fierce debate. 
When the term extension was first proposed, many commentators argued that there was no proper 
justification for the extension. For newly-created works, any additional incentive effect was likely 
to be minimal, given how far out into the future the additional years would be (i.e. more than 50 
years after the death of the author).
10
 Even worse, there was no incentive-based justification for 
                                                 
4
 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5
 Copyright Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
6
 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37 (1831). 
7
 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1909) (repealed 1978). 
8
 Pub. L. No. 94-553 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994)). 
9
 Pub. L. no. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304. 
10
 See, e.g., Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, 
H.R. 2589, and S. 505 Submitted to the Committees on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 105
th
 Cong. (1998) (written testimony of Dennis Karjala) [hereinafter Karjala, Statement]. See 
generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 417-18 (2002) (summarizing de-
bate). 
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applying the extension to already-existing works, since they had already been created.
11
 Thus, the 
term extension for existing copyrighted works amounted to nothing more than a raw transfer from 
the general public to private copyright owners. 
Supporters of the term extension argued that the term extension was necessary to make the 
U.S. term consistent with the term in the European Community (EC), which had recently extend-
ed the term to life plus 70 years.
12
 They argued that U.S. authors would be disadvantaged in Eu-
ropean markets, since the EC had adopted a rule that provided a term of protection for foreign 
works consisting of the shorter of the EC term or the term that existed in under the foreign work’s 
domestic law.
13
 Some supporters also argued that extending the term would create additional in-
centives for publishers to distribute existing works.
14
 
Ultimately, Congress sided with supporters of the bill, which included many companies, such 
as Disney, that owned copyrights that would have expired absent term extension. Thus, in 1998, 
Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
15
 extending the copyright term 
by an additional 20 years. The copyright term extension was subject to a constitutional challenge, 
brought by a number of individuals who argued that the extension violated both the ―limited 
Times‖ provision of Article I as well as the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Eldred 
v. Ashcroft,
16
 the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the term extension against these chal-
lenges. 
 
B. The Old Public Domain 
 
The practical effect of the copyright term extension was to freeze the public domain for pub-
lished works for a period of 20 years. Prior to 1998, copyrighted works had been passing into the 
public domain at a steady rate. Thus, for example, works published in the U.S. in 1922 all passed 
into the public domain on January 1, 1998.
17
 These works included The Waste Land, by T. S. Eli-
ot,
18
 and Ulysses, by James Joyce.
19
 Works published in 1921 passed into the public domain on 
January 1, 1997. These included F. Scott Fitzgerald’s This Side of Paradise,20 Edith Wharton’s 
Age of Innocence,
21
 and the song ―Over There‖ by George M. Cohan.22 
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., James Boyle, Cruel, Mean , or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2036 (2000); Liu, supra note __, at 418 n. 53. 
12
 See, e.g., The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the Senate Comm. On 
the Judiciary, 104
th
 Cong. 20, 23 (1995) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright); Symposi-
um, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 651, 690, 700 (2000) (statements by Arthur R. Miller and Jane C. Ginsburg); Liu, supra note __, 
at 419 (summarizing arguments). 
13
 Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L290) 9. 
14
 See Hon. Howard Coble, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
269, 296 (1998); Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn 
of the Millennium, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 736 (1998); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Boon 
for the American Creators and the American Economy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 319, 325 (1997). 
15
 Pub. L. no. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304. 
16
 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
17
 The term of protection for a given work lasts to the end of the calendar year in which the term would 
otherwise expire. 17 U.S.C. § 305. 
18
 T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND (1922). 
19
 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES (1922). But see Robert Spoo, Note, Copyright Protectionism and Its Discontents: 
The Case of James Joyce’s Ulysses in America, 108 YALE L.J. 633 (1998).  
20
 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THIS SIDE OF PARADISE (1920). 
21
 EDITH WHARTON, THE AGE OF INNOCENCE (1920). 
22
 George M. Cohan, Over There (1920). 
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Thus, as of 1998, the public domain contained every work published in the U.S. before 
1923.
23
 The public domain accordingly included a vast and rich range of materials. All literature 
published in the U.S. prior to 1923 was in the public domain. Thus, novels and poems by famous 
authors from the 19th and early 20th century were in the public domain. These included many 
works by Charles Dickens, Jane Austen, Emily Bronte, Leo Tolstoy, John Keats, Mark Twain, 
Jules Verne, Victor Hugo, Henrik Ibsen, and others. Pre-1923 literary works containing famous 
characters such as Sherlock Holmes were also in the public domain.
24
 
All music published prior to 1923 was in the public domain as well. Thus, the works of many 
of the great classical and romantic composers of the 19th century – Ludwig van Beethoven, Franz 
Liszt, Frédéric Chopin, Piotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, Richard Wagner, Franz Schubert, Gustav Mah-
ler, etc. – were in the public domain, free for others to copy and perform. In addition to classical 
music, some early popular music (e.g. Tin Pan Alley, ragtime) and early works of the jazz age 
published before 1923 would have been in the public domain as well. 
In the visual arts, all paintings and sculptures published prior to 1923 were in the public do-
main. Thus, the public domain contained published
25
 works by the great impressionist and post-
impressionist painters of the 19th century - Claude Monet, Édouard Manet, Paul Cézanne, 
Georges Seurat, Pierre-Auguste Renoir, etc., - as well as sculptures by Edgar Degas, Pierre-
Auguste Renoir, and others. By 1923, photography had already been invented, and thus early 
published photographs would have been included in the public domain as well.
26
  
The public domain as of 1998 would also have included some works that were distributed us-
ing technologies that were relatively new as of 1923. Player piano rolls were, by that date, a rela-
tively well-established means of distributing musical works. In addition, by 1923, a market for 
phonograph recordings had just started to develop. Thus, some of the musical works noted above 
would have been distributed using these new means.
27
 Finally, by 1923, motion pictures had been 
invented, and some of the earliest silent motion pictures (e.g. featuring Buster Keaton, Charlie 
Chaplin, etc.) would have been part of the public domain as well.
28
 
Thus, as of 1998, copyright law’s public domain contained a rich array of creative works pub-
lished in the U.S. prior to 1923 – literature, music, visual arts, early silent motion pictures. And 
indeed, the public domain had been growing steadily each year prior to 1998, as the copyright 
terms of creative works steadily expired.  
 
                                                 
23
 The public domain also contained many works published after 1923, which passed into the public do-
main due to failure to renew the copyright or to failure to comply with formalities. 
24
 See, e.g., ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, A STUDY IN SCARLET (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1890). 
25
 As we will later see, whether a given work of visual art was ―published‖ is not always easy to determine 
with certainty. See R. Anthony Reese, Photographs Of Public Domain Paintings: How, If At All, Should 
We Protect Them?, 34 J. CORP. L. 1033  (2009) (noting some of the complications). 
26
 See, e.g., Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photograph of Oscar Wilde enti-
tled to copyright protection). 
27
 Note that even if the musical work has passed into the public domain, the phonograph recording of the 
musical work may not be in the public domain. Prior to 1972, phonographs were not protected by federal 
copyright law, but instead by state law, which generally provided perpetual protection. In 1972, the federal 
Copyright Act was amended to bring post-1972 phonograph recordings within federal copyright. In that 
same statute, Congress indicated that pre-1972 phonograph recordings would all pass into the public do-
main no later than 2067. Thus, for most purposes, many if not most pre-1972 phonograph recordings are 
still protected under a patchwork of state laws. 
28
 Motion pictures were expressly added as a separate category under the 1909 Act in 1912. Act of Aug. 24, 
1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (1912) (amending Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §11, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 
(1909) (repealed 1976)). 
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C. The Effect of the Freeze 
 
Once Congress extended the copyright term in 1998, however, this steady passage of works 
into the public domain was halted for a period of 20 years. Thus, works published in 1923 (and 
thereafter), instead of entering the public domain as planned in 1999 (and thereafter), would re-
main under copyright until at least 2018. Works published in 1924, instead of entering the public 
domain in 2000, would remain under copyright until at least 2019. And so on.
29
 
These works included Disney’s original Mickey Mouse,30 Pluto, and Goofy, A. A. Milne’s 
Winnie the Pooh,
31
 George Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue,32 as well as numerous works by Cole 
Porter, Irving Berlin, Ernest Hemmingway, William Faulkner, and many others. These are all 
works that would have passed into the public domain, but for the term extension.
33
 
This state of affairs is about to come to an end. Unless Congress extends the term of copy-
right protection again, copyrights will once again begin to expire in 2019. Thus, on January 1, 
2019, all of the works published in 1923 will finally pass into the public domain, as 95 years will 
have passed since their publication. On January 1, 2020, all of the works published in 1924 will 
pass into the public domain. And so on. Thus, every year after 2018 will see an increase in the 
size and scope of the public domain.  
 
II. WHAT IS NEW ABOUT THE NEW PUBLIC DOMAIN? 
 
What will happen once works begin to pass into the public domain again in 2019? One possi-
bility: nothing much different than what happened before. After all, the public domain existed for 
more than 200 years in the U.S. prior to the most recent term extension. For centuries, works had 
been passing steadily into the public domain. And as recently as 1998, the public domain had 
been steadily expanding. Both copyright owners and potential users of copyrighted works were 
accustomed to this state of affairs. Thus, one might expect works to resume passing into the pub-
lic domain without much adjustment or fanfare. 
In this Part of the Article I argue that, in fact, there are good reasons to believe that the public 
domain after 2018 may not perfectly resemble the public domain that existed before 1998. This is 
in part because the works passing into the public domain post 2018 differ both quantitatively and 
qualitatively from the works that passed before. In part this is also because of dramatic technolog-
ical, economic, and cultural changes that have occurred in the intervening years. Thus, for many 
reasons, the new public domain will differ in important ways from what has come before. 
 
A. The Works Expected to Pass 
  
The copyrighted works that will begin passing into the public domain after 2018 consist of 
works first published in the U.S. in 1923 and thereafter. The new public domain will thus consist, 
at least initially, of works from the artistically creative and productive decades of the 1920s, 30s, 
and 40s. Although the works prior to 1923 encompassed many important and vital cultural works, 
                                                 
29
 See generally Dennis Karjala, Opposing Copyright Extension, at 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/ (listing works that would have 
passed into public domain but for the term extension). 
30
 See STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1928). 
31
 See Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly In The Information Age: Slowing The Convergence At The Mar-
ketplace Of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491 (1999).  
32
 See John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E2.  
33
 See William F. Patry, Fair Use And Statutory Reform In The Wake Of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 
(2004) (describing in detail many of the foregone uses of works that would have passed into the public do-
main absent term extension); Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case For Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 287 (2002). 
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it is important to note some of the ways in which works after 1923 differ, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, from works produced before. 
 Perhaps the area where there will be least difference is literature. Many important works of 
literature will pass into the public domain after 2018. For example, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The 
Great Gatsby will pass into the public domain in 2021.
34
 Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway will 
pass into the public domain that year as well.
35
 Many works by Ernest Hemingway, Joseph Con-
rad, Franz Kafka, W. Somerset Maugham, and others will all pass into the public domain. Yet in 
many ways, this is not all that different from the state of affairs that existed prior to 1998, when 
important literary works were passing into the public domain at a steady pace.
36
 
A greater difference may be found in the realm of music. The dividing line between the new 
and old public domain (i.e. the year 1923) coincides with the birth of the jazz age in the U.S. 
Thus, after 2018, many musical works from this artistically productive era will begin passing into 
the public domain. Many compositions by George and Ira Gershwin (―Rhapsody in Blue,‖37 
―Fascinating Rhythm‖38), Irving Berlin (―All Alone,‖39), and Gus Kahn (―It Had to be You,‖40 
―I’ll See You in My Dreams‖41) will enter the public domain. Many songs from popular musicals, 
such as ―Showboat,‖42 including ―Ol’ Man River‖43 (by Oscar Hammerstein II, Jerome Kern), 
will also pass into the public domain. The late 1920s and early 1930s also saw the first blues re-
cordings of performers such as Tommy Johnson, Robert Wilkins, Son House, and Robert John-
son. The 1930s witnessed the birth of the swing era and big band music.
44
 Thus, the new public 
domain will, for the first time, contain, not just classical music, but some of the great works of the 
blues, jazz, and swing ages.
45
 
In addition, the decades after 1923 witnessed important changes in the way music was dis-
tributed and thus important differences in the cultural significance and salience of musical works. 
Prior to 1923, musical works were distributed largely through live public performances, sales of 
sheet music (which was a dominant industry in the 1800s and early 1900s),
 46
 or through the then-
new technologies of the player piano roll
47
 and very early gramophone recordings.
48
 After 1923, 
                                                 
34
 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (1925). 
35
 VIRGINIA WOOLF, MRS. DALLOWAY (1925). 
36
 A similar situation exists with respect to the fine arts. See, e.g., works such as the painting ―American 
Gothic‖ by Grant Wood (1930). 
37
 George Gershwin, Rhapsody in Blue (1924); see John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 3, 1999, at E2. 
38
 George Gershwin & Ira Gershwin, Fascinating Rhythm (1924). 
39
 Irving Berlin, All Alone (1924). 
40
 Gus Kahn, It Had to Be You (1924). 
41
 Gus Kahn, I’ll See You In My Dreams (1924). 
42
 Jerome Kern & Oscar Hammerstein II, Showboat (1927) (musical); SHOWBOAT (1929) (film). 
43
 Jerome Kern & Oscar Hammerstein II, Ol’ Man River (1927). 
44
 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hall, Blues And The Public Domain--No More Dues To Pay?, 42 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'Y U.S.A. 215 (1995) (highlighting some of the complications in determining whether blues recordings 
are in the public domain). 
45
 See generally Paul J. Heald, Does The Song Remain The Same? An Empirical Study Of Bestselling Musi-
cal Compositions (1913-1932) And Their Use In Cinema (1968-2007), 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 11 
(2009) (listing many prominent songs from this period). 
46
 See Richard French, ―The Dilemma of the Music Publishing Industry,‖ in Paul Henry Lang, ed., ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF MUSIC IN AMERICA 173 (1961) (―[I]n order to have any music at all a century ago, 
either of two conditions had to be met: either people had to make it themselves, or they had to come within 
earshot of others making it. In this respect, the people of the 19
th
 century differed in no way from their an-
cestors of the 18
th
, 16
th
, or 14
th
 centuries …. They differ only from us.‖). 
47
 See, e.g., White-Smith Pub’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding piano rolls did not infringe 
upon musical works), legislatively overruled by Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 
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distribution of musical works began increasingly to occur in recorded form, on phonorecords.
49
 In 
addition, the first commercial radio stations began broadcasting in the U.S. in the early 1920s. By 
1931, two out of every five homes in the U.S. had a radio. By 1938, four out of every five homes 
in the U.S. had a radio.
50
 As a result of these dramatic technological changes, popular music be-
came far more widespread and accessible to a greater number of individuals. This is perhaps one 
reason why many musical works from this era have continuing cultural significance today. 
The differences are perhaps even more significant with respect to the movie industry.
51
 The 
date 1923 also closely marks the transition from the silent film era to the talking film era. Motion 
pictures had, of course, already been invented prior to 1923, and a market existed for silent films, 
such as Birth of a Nation
52
, and the early films of Charlie Chaplin
53
 and Buster Keaton.
54
 The first 
successful talking movie, The Jazz Singer, however, was not distributed until 1927.
55
 Thereafter, 
the industry witnessed explosive growth, with the birth of the studio system in the 1920s. Thus, 
the new public domain after 2018 will, for the very first time, contain works from the golden age 
of film, such as The Wizard of Oz
56
 and Gone With the Wind,
57
 which is still considered the high-
est-grossing film of all time.
58
 
The rise of both the recorded music and movie industries post-1920 highlights the way in 
which the new public domain will differ dramatically in terms, not only of the content of these 
works, but the type of works. For the first time, the public domain post 2019 will contain signifi-
cant works that were distributed to the public through fixed recordings (of musical works) or pub-
lic performance of fixed recordings (via radio broadcasts or in movie theaters). Prior to that time, 
the technology simply did not exist for this kind of mass consumption of works fixed in mechani-
cal form. 
Perhaps most significantly, a number of iconic characters and images from the 1920s and 
1930s will pass into the public domain after 2018. The most iconic of these is probably Mickey 
Mouse, which first publicly appeared in the form of the character Steamboat Willie in 1928, in a 
short animated film of that same name.
59
 Without the term extension, the character would have 
passed into the public domain in 2004. Now, however, the character will be expected to pass into 
the public domain on January 1, 2024. Other iconic characters include Minnie Mouse,
60
 Donald 
Duck,
61
 Pluto,
62
 Winnie the Pooh,
63
 and Superman.
64
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75 YEARS (1996). 
51
 See generally Richard Griffith & Arthur Mayer, THE MOVIES (2d ed. 1970); Joel W. Finler, THE 
HOLLYWOOD STORY (1988). 
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 D.W. Griffith, THE BIRTH OF A NATION (1915). 
53
 See, e.g., KID AUTO RACES IN VENICE (1914) (first appearance of the ―Little Tramp‖ character); THE 
IMMIGRANT (1917). 
54
 See, e.g., THE SAPHEAD (1920); ONE WEEK (1920). 
55
 THE JAZZ SINGER (1927). 
56
 THE WIZARD OF OZ (1939). 
57
 GONE WITH THE WIND (1939). 
58
 William Patry, The Failure Of The American Copyright System: Protecting The Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 907 (1997) (discussing movies that may yet pass into the public domain). 
59
 Walt Disney, STEAMBOAT WILLIE (1928). 
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 First appearance in STEAMBOAT WILLIE (1928). 
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 First appearance in THE LITTLE WISE HEN (1934). 
62
 First appearance in THE CHAIN GANG (1930). 
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These iconic visual characters represent a significant departure from the public domain pre-
1998. Although the old public domain certainly included famous literary and visual characters 
(such as Sherlock Holmes, Santa Claus, etc.), the increase in mass and visual media post 1920 led 
to the creation and broad dissemination of visual characters such as Mickey Mouse, who have 
been the subject of aggressive marketing techniques and who have since achieved iconic status. It 
is difficult to find as many visual characters with the same significance in the public domain that 
existed prior to 1998. 
Moreover, such characters have been the subject of constant continuing creative exploitation, 
such that they retain significance many years later. Thus, the demand for many of these new pub-
lic domain works is likely to be quite strong today. For example, demand for Mickey Mouse-
related works is extremely robust even today, as the sales figures at Disney stores can attest. Es-
timates place the annual revenue resulting from licensing of Mickey Mouse and friends at more 
than $5 billion.
 65
 Thus, when Mickey Mouse passes into the public domain, there will likely be a 
good deal of demand. 
Again, it is certainly true the public domain prior to 1998 was quite rich and contained many 
important works. In making the point that the post 2018 public domain is different, it is important 
not to overstate the case. And there is certainly the risk that, in viewing the 1920s and 1930s from 
our vantage point today, we may exaggerate the differences from decade to decade. 
However, it is also important to note that there are some very real and significant differences 
in the shape and form of the public domain to come. The new public domain will contain, for the 
very first time, significant numbers of important works that were performed or distributed in 
fixed recorded form (as opposed to live performances)—the result of the rise of mass media. It 
will also contain a significant number of iconic works that have enduring appeal today. These 
differences suggest that the new public domain will play a more prominent role in our cultural 
landscape. 
 
B. Changes Since 1998 
 
Not only are the works passing into the public domain after 2018 different from the works 
that passed into the public domain before 1998, but the environment they are entering also differs 
in dramatic ways. On the one hand, only 20 years will have passed since the public domain was 
frozen, and it is hard to imagine too much changing in that time period. Yet anyone who has paid 
attention to the copyright industries over the past 10 years knows that we are going through a 
dramatic period of change and disruption. The copyright industries have been subject to dramatic 
technological, economic, and cultural changes, which we can expect to continue for the next sev-
eral years. These changes will make it possible for these new public domain works to have a 
greater immediate impact on our cultural and creative landscape than ever before. 
 
1. Technological Changes 
 
First and foremost, the technological changes that have occurred since 1998 have been 
breathtaking. In 1998, the first Internet boom was underway. Internet access was somewhat wide-
spread, as approximately 40% of adults in the U.S. used the internet either at home or at work 
                                                                                                                                                 
63
 A. A. Milne, WINNIE THE POOH (1926). 
64
 Jerry Siegel & Joseph Schuster, ACTION COMICS NO. 1 (April 18, 1938). 
65
 See Vanessa Gisquet & Lacey Rose, Top Characters Gross $25B, FORBES.COM (Oct. 19, 2004), available 
at: http://www.forbes.com/lists/2004/10/20/cz_vq_lr_1020fictionalintro.html (estimating gross worldwide 
merchandising and licensing revenues for the following characters: Mickey Mouse and friends ($5.8 bil-
lion), Winnie the Pooh and friends ($5.6 billion)). 
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(although many accessed the internet via slow dial-up connections).
66
 New companies were be-
ginning to take advantage of opportunities presented by the new technology. At the same time, 
significant uncertainty existed as to what business models would ultimately be successful.  
This was particularly true of the copyright industries. As of 1998, authorized digital distribu-
tion of many copyrighted works through the internet was extremely limited. Although websites 
contained short articles and pictures, more sustained works of authorship (such as novels, music, 
movies) were not generally available in legal form over the internet. Many copyright owners were 
hesitant to begin digital distribution of their works, out of uncertainty and concerns about unau-
thorized copying.  
Take, for example, the music industry. In 1998, consumers still purchased music CDs through 
local record stores or online. Indeed, per capita sales of CDs in the U.S. peaked around 1999.
67
 
There existed, as of 1998, no effective legal way to purchase recorded music in purely digital 
form. And indeed, unauthorized music file-sharing over the internet had not yet become wide-
spread, as the peer-to-peer file sharing program Napster was not introduced until 1999.
68
 The rec-
orded music industry was thus, as of 1998, still very much based on the sale of physical CDs. Le-
gal delivery of music online did not effectively exist. 
Today, the market looks very different. After 1999, the explosive growth of unauthorized 
file-sharing through Napster and other peer-to-peer services led to widespread demand for purely 
digital distribution of music. After Napster was effectively shut down in 2001, the music industry 
responded to this demand by offering authorized digital downloads of music. Ever since the in-
troduction of iTunes in 2003, legal digital distribution of recorded music has become well-
established. Consumers can purchase individual songs in digital form through many on-line re-
tailers, to play on a wide range of personal devices. Internet radio and other streaming services 
make music readily available to consumers. Although there is still much uncertainty about pre-
cisely what models will be successful in the long run, music is, today, widely accessible in digital 
form. 
The differences are even greater in other copyright industries. In 1998, legal copies of motion 
pictures in pure digital form (as opposed to DVDs) were not generally available to consumers. 
Moreover, unauthorized file sharing was far more limited than for music, given limitations on 
Internet bandwidth. Today, authorized digital copies of motion pictures are available for down-
load over the internet and over cable networks. Unauthorized digital downloads are available 
through peer-to-peer filesharing services such as BitTorrent. Consumers own many devices that 
are designed to play these works. Thus, ready distribution channels exist for movies in digital 
form. 
Similarly, the market for digital copies of works of literature has changed significantly. In 
1998, the market for digital copies of books was quite limited. Consumers did not enjoy reading 
extended literary works on their computer screens, and there were doubts about whether they 
would ever make this adjustment. Even though many works of great literature were in the public 
domain, few imagined that they would read these works on computer devices. Today, many hand-
held platforms exist designed specifically for digital textual works, and these platforms have wit-
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 See Pew Research Center, ―Internet Adoption, 1995-2010,‖ available at:  
http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data/Internet-Adoption.aspx; Susannah Fox, ―The Internet Circa 1998,‖ 
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 See Bain & Co., PUBLISHING IN THE DIGITAL ERA (2011), available at: 
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DeGusta, ―The REAL Death of the Music Industry,‖ (Feb. 18, 2011), available at 
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 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). 
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nessed widespread adoption. Moreover, this market is projected to expand rapidly.
69
 Indeed, in 
2011, eBook sales for the first time exceeded sales of physical books at Amazon.com.
70
 
Many companies have taken advantage of these technological changes to offer access to 
works that are already in the public domain. So, for example, many organizations such as Eldritch 
Press, Project Gutenberg, Amazon.com, etc. make available, for free, works of literature that have 
already passed into the public domain. Many websites contain pictures of works of visual art that 
have passed into the public domain, thus greatly increasing the number of individuals who can 
view them. Organizations have yet to do this in any sustained way for recorded music or motion 
pictures, but this is due, as described above, to the fact that most of these works are still under 
copyright.  
The works that will soon be passing into the public domain thus face a well-developed and 
established market for digital distribution, one that simply did not exist in 1998.
 71
 Thus, when 
works such as George Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue or the movie Gone With the Wind pass into 
the public domain, they will be readily accessible to consumers via iTunes, Amazon.com, Netflix, 
or any number of other companies. Similarly, as works of literature such as F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
The Great Gatsby or A. A. Milne’s Winnie the Pooh pass into the public domain, consumers will 
be able to readily download them onto their Kindles, Nooks, iPads, or other devices.  
  
2. Economic Changes 
  
The technological changes mentioned in the previous section have been accompanied, as one 
would expect, by dramatic changes in the economic structure of the copyright markets. Perhaps 
the most significant impact of these changes has been to dramatically reduce the marginal cost of 
distributing copyrighted works. In 1998, physical channels still dominated the distribution of 
copyrighted materials, whether in the form of CDs, DVDs, or books. Today, electronic dissemi-
nation of copyrighted materials is well-established and fast overtaking physical distribution. By 
2018, we can expect even greater changes. 
This reduction in the cost of distribution means that new public domain works will be trivial-
ly easy to distribute. As a result, we can expect these works to have a greater immediate impact 
than ever before. Prior to 1998, when a work of literature passed into the public domain, the 
widespread dissemination of that work took some time, as publishers printed copies of the book 
for sale in physical book stores. Moreover, such works, while often priced at a discount to similar 
books still subject to copyright,
72
 still cost a non-trivial amount, due to the costs of printing, dis-
tribution, retailing, etc. 
In 2019, however, once a novel passes into the public domain, copies of that novel can be dis-
tributed the next day around the world at near- zero cost. Consumers will be able to immediately 
download the novel for free, just as they currently do for novels already in the public domain.
73
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 Mark Walsh, ―E-Book Sales to Hit $9 Billion in 2013,‖ ONLINE MEDIA DAILY (June 1, 2009), available 
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 Chris Davies, ―Kindle eBook Sales Exceed Print Sales in US,‖ SLASHGEAR (May 19, 2011), available at: 
http://www.slashgear.com/kindle-ebook-sales-exceed-print-sales-in-us-19153084/. 
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 See Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Winter/Spring 2003) (noting the ways in which digital technologies may enhance 
the public domain). 
72
 See Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: An Empirical 
Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1046-50 (2008). 
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MARKETING SCIENCE 742 (2007) .  
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The same would apply for any piece of music or movie. Thus, such works will have dramatically 
greater immediate distribution, and impact, than works entering the public domain prior to 1998. 
The very technology that has posed such a significant threat to copyrighted works presents an 
unprecedented opportunity for widespread dissemination of works in the public domain. 
The dramatic lowering of the distribution costs has also had an impact, not only on the speed 
and extent of distribution of public domain works, but on the range of works that can now be 
cost-effectively distributed. Prior to 1998, obscure works of literature passing into the public do-
main were often unable to find the small number of individuals who might have been interested in 
the work. The costs of physical printing and distribution were too high to make it worth it to serve 
these very small markets. Today, the low digital distribution costs make it economically feasible 
to distribute works with even minimal demand, satisfying the so-called ―long tail‖ of the demand 
distribution. Thus, even the more obscure post-1923 public domain works will be able to find an 
audience.
74
 
 
3. Cultural Changes 
 
Finally, the new public domain works face a different cultural landscape. Digital technology 
has not only lowered the cost of distributing copyrighted works, it has also made it far easier for 
third parties to creatively work with and adapt existing works. Prior to 1998, it took a good 
amount of technology and skill to take existing copyrighted works and adapt them to new purpos-
es. Today, computer technology and software make this far easier. Third parties can take digital 
files and clip, reuse, and remix these works into new works. 
The drastic reduction in the costs of adapting copyrighted works has expanded the universe of 
individuals who can engage in this kind of use. Prior to 1998, these kinds of uses were more lim-
ited to established players in the industry. After all, it required special equipment and knowledge 
to manipulate existing works. Moreover, disseminating the results of this kind of work required 
resources, since they still had to be distributed in physical form. Today, no special equipment, 
beyond a computer and some software, is required to either engage in this kind of reuse or to dis-
tribute the results to the world. Thus, individuals are far more engaged now in this kind of use. 
This change in technology has led to an increased cultural interest in these remixes and 
mashups.
75
 Demand for such remixes can be found everywhere from popular music to YouTube 
to television to motion pictures. Creators of popular music and television increasingly incorporate 
and reference existing works. Individuals and consumers increasingly incorporate creative works 
into their own works, posting the results on YouTube or in other venues. Moreover, as the tech-
nologies become easier to use and more accessible, the results are becoming increasingly sophis-
ticated. As Larry Lessig and others have documented, we are increasingly living in a remix cul-
ture.
76
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Many of these remixes to date have been made of existing copyrighted works. These uses 
raise some tricky questions regarding the scope of fair use. Thus, the scope of reuse has been lim-
ited both by law and by uncertainty. Once works pass into the public domain, however, the uncer-
tainty is practically eliminated.
77
 Public domain works can be freely appropriated by third parties 
for reuse in all manner of ways. For example, soon it will be open season on Mickey Mouse. 
Once Mickey Mouse passes into the public domain, third parties can incorporate Mickey Mouse 
freely into their own works. They can make works of art, comic books, movies, etc. incorporating 
Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, Donald Duck, Winnie the Pooh, Superman, and other characters. 
Thus, as these new works pass into the public domain, we can expect an increased ability by third 
parties to adapt them to create new works and to distribute the results to a wide audience.  
 
* * * 
 
So for all of the reasons articulated above, not only will the works passing into the new public 
domain be materially different in both their distribution technologies and cultural significance, 
they will enter a technological, economic, and cultural environment that is poised to make imme-
diate and effective use of these works in ways that did not exist in 1998.
78
 
 
III. THE PROMISE OF THE NEW PUBLIC DOMAIN 
 
In this Part, I explore some of the implications of the new public domain for copyright policy 
more generally. I begin by describing some of the more recent literature on the public domain that 
arose in the wake of the copyright term extension. As a result of this rich literature, we have a 
better understanding and appreciation of the role that the public domain can play in the copyright 
balance. I then discuss how the important differences in the new public domain, when understood 
in light of this new literature, help support the argument that the public domain will potentially 
play a far more significant role in the copyright balance. More specifically, the potential exists for 
the creation of a rich repository of important and iconic cultural works, which a wide range of 
individuals, empowered by new technology, can freely access, share, re-cast, and transform. 
 
A. Public Domain Theory and Literature 
 
The copyright term extension in 1998 was opposed by a wide range of economists, copyright 
scholars, businesses, and public interest groups.
79
 Indeed, it is difficult to find any issue in copy-
right law for which there was greater agreement within the academic copyright community. Thus, 
in many ways, the successful extension of the copyright term was a bitter defeat and a frustrating 
reminder of the powerlessness of copyright academics, particularly in the face of determined and 
focused economic interests. 
One positive side effect of the defeat, however, was a resurgence in academic interest regard-
ing the public domain. Well before the debate over term extension, a number of noted scholars 
had written eloquently about the importance of the public domain. Both Ralph Brown and Ben-
jamin Kaplan wrote about the importance of the public domain as a wellspring of creativity.
80
 L. 
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Ray Patterson’s work also highlighted the role played by a vibrant public domain.81 Thus, early 
commentators recognized the role that the public domain played in setting the overall copyright 
balance.
82
 
The striking thing about some of the earliest accounts of the public domain was the way in 
which they characterized copyright protection as the exception rather than the rule. These early 
scholars saw the public domain as the general background, the default rule, against which the lim-
ited copyright rights operated. This made sense, given the structure of copyright law at the time. 
Prior to the 1976 Act, the public domain played a more prominent role in the copyright balance, 
as there were many more ways in which works could pass into the public domain, e.g. through 
failure to renew the copyright or failure to comply with formalities such as notice. 
The 1976 Act, however, effected significant changes in the nature and scope of the public 
domain. Beyond extending the term of copyright protection, the Act also significantly restricted 
the ways in which works could pass into the public domain. First, the 1976 Act did away with the 
renewal term, replacing it with a single, unified term. Thus, works no longer passed into the pub-
lic domain due to failure to renew. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the 1976 Act and the 
later 1988 amendments weakened the effect of formalities. After the 1976 and 1988 Acts, failure 
to comply with formalities such as notice no longer cast works into the public domain. This had 
the practical effect of bringing within copyright a vast number of works that formerly would have 
been in the public domain. It had the effect of changing the default rule, from a presumption that 
an un-marked work was in the public domain, to a presumption that such works were protected 
by copyright.
 83
 
In the wake of some of these changes, a number of scholars began expressing concern about 
the reduced scope of the public domain. Both David Lange and Jessica Litman wrote early, pres-
cient articles about the important role of the public domain in promoting creative expression, and 
the ways in which that role was being undermined by more expansive visions of copyright.
84
 The-
se early articles began sounding the alarm.
85
 
It was not until the recent term extension debate, however, that the public domain became a 
subject of sustained interest to a broad range of copyright scholars.
86
 In building the case against 
term extension, many commentators were forced to come up with a clearer account of what, pre-
cisely, was being lost through term extension. This, in turn, led to focused attention on the con-
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DRAFT: 9/9/11 THE NEW PUBLIC DOMAIN PAGE 16 
 
crete benefits of the public domain. These efforts were pushed along by a landmark conference at 
Duke, focusing expressly on the public domain and its role in the copyright balance.
87
 
A good deal of this literature was definitional, analogic, or cartographic in nature, addressing 
the question: what, precisely, do we mean when we speak of copyright’s public domain?88 Was 
the public domain merely the set of works for which the term of copyright protection had ex-
pired? Or did it more broadly encompass things – such as facts, ideas, concepts – that could never 
be the subject of copyright protection?
89
 Or perhaps even more broadly, did it include the set of 
all permissible uses, such as fair use? Much of the literature was aimed at coming to a clearer and 
more precise understanding of the term public domain. 
Though in many ways descriptive, this literature also clearly had a normative impulse. It ad-
dressed, both implicitly and explicitly, the question: why do we care about these definitions? 
What is to be gained by, as Edward Samuels put it, ―reifying the negative?‖90 Why not, for exam-
ple, simply think of the public domain as what is left over, the negative space? Many scholars 
argued that focusing on a concrete and precise definition of the public domain not only helped 
foster clearer thinking about the public domain, but also served to give the concept rhetorical 
force, as a counterweight to unthinking copyright expansion. In more practical terms, as James 
Boyle argued, an affirmative account of the public domain would enable the building of coali-
tions to protect it, much as the concept of ―the environment‖ facilitated the rise of the environ-
mental protection movement.
91
 
 In addition to considering the definitional issue, much of the literature focused sustained at-
tention on the concrete normative benefits of the public domain. To some extent, this was a re-
sponse to arguments that the public domain in fact had few such benefits. During the extension 
debate, many proponents of term extension had argued that the public domain was a repository of 
low-value works, and therefore was not terribly important.
92
 Others argued that, although the pub-
lic domain might contain some valuable works, they were underutilized because no one had any 
incentive to commercialize them, or conversely (and somewhat contradictorily) because their val-
ue had been dissipated through overuse.
93
 
In responding to these arguments, commentators detailed a number of concrete benefits de-
rived from the public domain. First, many persuasively argued that public domain status would 
lead to increased, not decreased, dissemination of copies of public domain works. From a theoret-
ical perspective, this was due to the elimination of not only royalties, but potential licensing costs, 
which in some cases could be quite high (for example, finding the copyright owner, negotiating a 
license, dealing with legal uncertainty, etc.). Empirical work by Paul Heald has supported this 
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view.
94
 Thus, one concrete benefit can be seen in the wider dissemination and availability, at low-
er cost, of public domain works. This furthers the broad copyright interest in expanding access to 
creative works. 
Second, a rich and vibrant public domain can encourage greater creativity. As many commen-
tators have long noted, authors and creators often draw on prior works for inspiration. No work is 
completely and utterly original. To the extent more works are in the public domain, authors and 
creators have more material to draw upon in creating their own works. Moreover, they can build 
upon these works without incurring the not-insignificant costs of royalties or licensing. Thus, 
from an economic perspective, a robust public domain reduces the cost of creating additional 
works by reducing the cost of one of the critical inputs. 
More interesting, however, has been recent attention on the role the public domain can play, 
not in the economics of creativity, but in the psychology of creativity. David Lange, Julie Cohen, 
and others have focused attention on the creative process and on the intrinsic rather than extrinsic 
motivations for creativity.
95
 Much recent research on the psychology of creativity has revealed 
the importance of freedom and play in the creative process. Scholars such as Lange and Cohen 
have noted how copyright law can inhibit the creative impulse by limiting the freedom of authors 
to engage with existing works. Even the need to consider asking for permission can have an im-
pact on the creative impulse. Conversely, a robust public domain, as a permission-free zone, can 
play an important role in supporting and encouraging these intrinsic motivations, in freeing up the 
artistic imagination.
96
 
Relatedly, a robust public domain encourages, not only more creativity, but a broader range 
of perspectives. In many cases, copyright owners can not only extract payment for use of their 
works, but also control what kinds of uses are made of their works. And indeed, there is an exten-
sive history of copyright owners using copyright to prevent uses with which they disagree. For 
example, the estate of James Joyce has used copyright to restrict particular kinds of critical com-
mentary. The owners of the copyright in Martha Graham’s dances have prevented certain inter-
pretations with which they disagree. The owners of the copyright in Samuel Beckett’s ―Waiting 
for Godot‖ refused to give permission for a version of the play in which the tramp characters 
were played by women. Once these works are in the public domain, however, this kind of control 
vanishes, and we can expect a far wider range of perspectives on existing works.  
Third, a robust public domain plays an important role in facilitating, not only an increase in 
the absolute amount of creative effort, but an expansion in the range of individuals who engage in 
creative endeavors. Once the economic barriers to building on existing works are eliminated, pro-
ductive activity is no longer limited to those who have the resources and sophistication to trace 
copyright ownership, negotiate licenses, and pay royalties. Instead, anyone who has access to the 
original work can build upon it. Thus, a robust public domain can play an important role in in-
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creasing participation in the creation of culture.
97
 This is a view grounded, less in the ideal of ro-
mantic authorship, and more in the notion of participation and civic republicanism.
98
 
Fourth and finally, some commentators have focused, not on the actions of creators, but on 
the end-results of their creation, arguing that a robust public domain supports the creation of a 
rich and satisfying culture. This view departs somewhat from the general ostensible position of 
aesthetic neutrality in copyright.
99
 It asks whether our copyright laws are successful in creating a 
rich and robust culture.
100
 On this account, rather than limiting the development of subsequent 
works to those who own the original copyright (or can negotiate a license), a robust public do-
main enables a greater diversity of expression by a greater number of individuals, and this is, on 
balance, a good thing.  
At the same time, there have been voices counseling some caution about the unalloyed bene-
fits of the public domain. Unlike some earlier critiques of the public domain, these accounts 
acknowledge the general benefits of a robust public domain. However, they note some of the 
ways in which the public domain may have distributional consequences, favoring some while 
harming others. For example, Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder have noted how an overly 
idealized notion of the public domain may fail to recognize the harms suffered by those who do 
not have the means to commercially exploit valuable resources of which they are stewards.
101
 
Thus, in the years immediately before the term extension and during the subsequent freeze in 
the public domain, there has been a flourishing of academic literature on the importance and val-
ue of the public domain. The result is a far richer and more nuanced understanding of what we 
mean when we speak of the public domain and the role that the public domain can potentially 
play in setting the copyright balance. It is somewhat poignant, and perhaps not at all unexpected, 
that this understanding came soon after these benefits of the public domain were temporarily fro-
zen due to the term extension. 
 
B. The Public Domain’s New Potential Role 
 
The new literature on the public domain provides a valuable framework for understanding 
how the new public domain, as described in the preceding sections, is poised to play an even 
more important role in setting the overall copyright balance. To some extent, the extensive defini-
tional literature on the public domain is less directly relevant to the new public domain as defined 
in this Article. This Article has adopted a narrow definition of the public domain, limiting it to 
just the set of works for which copyright protection has expired. Thus, although much careful and 
important work has been done to better define the public domain, this better understanding will 
have less of an impact on this particular issue. 
Yet the new public domain can have a definitional impact in other ways, not discussed in this 
literature. To an extent, some of this literature is motivated by a desire to expand the legal defini-
tion of the public domain, as a way of providing a counterweight to copyright expansionism. 
However, another way of expanding our understanding of the public domain is to expand, not its 
definition, but its content. Even if we keep a particular definition of the public domain constant, 
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we can still increase its practical significance by ensuring that the definition or category is popu-
lated by a rich and ever-increasing set of important works.  
Once the important and iconic works of the 1920s and 1930s begin entering the public do-
main, the practical definition of the public domain (or at least one part of the public domain) will 
have been expanded. Once Mickey Mouse enters the public domain, the content of the public 
domain will have changed, along with our understanding of what it means. Once the public do-
main contains, for the first time, major motion pictures and other new types of works, we will 
think of the public domain in different terms.  In this way, the relevance and importance of the 
public domain can be increased without changing its definition. 
Moreover, as more important works enter the public domain, the popular appreciation for and 
understanding of the public domain will change as well. To some extent, the potential benefits of 
a robust public domain have not yet been fully realized, given the nature of the works pre-1923 
and the limited means of distribution of these works pre-1998. The iconic works about to enter 
the public domain, along with the new environment that these works will soon enter, hold the po-
tential that the public domain will have a greater practical and more immediate relevance to the 
general public.  
For example, owners of eBook readers like the Kindle will see a direct, concrete benefit when 
a host of literary works pass into the public domain on January 1, 2019, as they will immediately 
have free access to a list of new works. Similarly, once other companies begin making and selling 
their own Mickey Mouse or Winnie the Pooh movies, books, comics, etc., the consuming public 
will begin to see the practical benefits of the new public domain in a way that is far more concrete 
than general appeals to the abstract idea of a public domain.  
This, in turn, holds out the potential for the building of coalitions around protecting the public 
domain. Coalitions are more likely to form when the members have a direct and concrete interest 
in the subject matter. Until recently, the popular interest in the public domain has been relatively 
limited, as its benefits have been diffuse. Once those interests become more concrete, future at-
tempts to limit the public domain will run into more resistance.
102
 This is likely one reason many 
copyright owners have fought so fiercely to extend the copyright term, to prevent these interests 
from forming.  
 Our better understanding of the normative function of the public domain can also shed light 
on the role of the new public domain. Certainly, the benefits from dissemination of public domain 
works will be greater and more immediate. As already mentioned above, the important literary, 
musical, and audio-visual works of the 1920s and 1930s will have an already existing and well-
developed infrastructure for immediate and low-cost dissemination. Rather than waiting for the 
physical production and distribution of public domain works, consumers will have immediate free 
access to these works. Indeed, one could imagine detailed lists of soon-to-be-public-domain 
works that are ―coming soon,‖ just as new movies or DVDs are announced prior to distribution. 
In addition, the creative benefits of the new public domain will potentially be greater. New 
artists will be able to build upon a rich new set of important works. Moreover, they will have the 
technological ability to transform these works and distribute them around the world at nearly zero 
cost. Thus, for example, once Mickey Mouse passes into the public domain, other companies will 
be able to create their own Mickey Mouse cartoons and movies. Moreover, changes in technology 
mean that an even wider range of individuals can participate in the production of culture. Not on-
ly companies, but creative individuals will be able to make their own Mickey Mouse cartoons and 
distribute them to a world-wide audience. 
These abilities will be enhanced by the nature of some of these new public domain works, as 
they will, for the first time, encompass significant numbers of creative works in fixed, recorded 
form, namely major motion pictures. Although pre-1998 public domain works included fixed vis-
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ual works (such as paintings, images, and photographs), they largely omitted fixed works in rec-
orded form. Post 2018, individuals will be able to, for the first time, manipulate public domain 
talking movies. Thus, the types of expression based on public domain works will have expand-
ed.
103
 
The public domain status of these new works will be particularly important, given the insights 
from the psychological literature on creativity. By expanding the scope of the public domain and 
populating it with important works that have continuing relevance today, the new public domain 
holds the potential for a wider and richer realm of creative play. This realm will be free from the 
uncertainty of fair use or concerns about royalties and licensing.
104
 Thus, if this literature is accu-
rate, we can expect not only differences in the amount of creative activity, but the nature of that 
activity. The end result, will be a more robust and diverse cultural landscape. 
Of course, there may be costs incurred by a new and more robust public domain. One poten-
tial risk is that critics of the public domain may be right, and that there will be little incentive to 
commercialize public domain works, since those who commercialize these works (e.g. by putting 
them in digital form, promoting them to a wide audience) will not be able to keep others from 
free-riding on their efforts. However, the dramatic reduction in the costs of distribution suggest 
that there is little public goods concern here. Moreover, empirical studies suggest that existing 
incentives are more than adequate to ensure commercialization of these works.
105
 
 Certainly, former copyright owners will experience a real loss. For example, Disney Corp. 
stands to lose hundreds of millions, if not billions, in revenue from the expiration of its copy-
rights. Yet this revenue is a direct transfer to Disney from consumers. Disney was able to obtain 
this revenue by using copyright law to restrict free dissemination and prevent competition. This 
was justified, at least originally, by the need to provide incentives to create works in the first 
place. But having created them based on the existing copyright term, there is no justification for 
future such restrictions. Thus, while this is a private loss to Disney and other copyright holders, it 
is not a net social loss, as the public will reap substantial benefits from the public domain status 
of these works and their subsequent wide dissemination. 
Perhaps more serious is a potential concern about the loss of coherence of formerly copy-
righted works. This is not a concern about the economic benefit to the copyright owner, but rather 
a concern about losses experienced by consumers as a result of the dissipation of the meaning of a 
work. For example, once others are free to make their own Mickey Mouse cartoons, or tell their 
own Winnie the Pooh stories, the possibility exists that we will have many variations of Mickey 
Mouse (a Chinese Mickey Mouse, a drug-dealing Mickey Mouse, an alien Mickey Mouse), such 
that the value that consumers place on a coherent vision of Mickey Mouse will be reduced. This 
is a serious concern, and one that has been thoughtfully developed by Justin Hughes, in particu-
lar.
106
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Note that this is a concern that is somewhat unique to expressive and communicative prod-
ucts such as copyrighted works. When it comes to other consumer products, we do not ordinarily 
object to variety or a wide range of different products or features. Indeed, we ordinarily believe 
that this is a benefit to consumers. We do not believe that consumers would be better off with a 
single shared understanding of the specific features of a toaster oven or car radio. Similarly, a 
good argument can be made that diversity and a wide range of options serves consumers of copy-
righted works. By giving Disney exclusive control over Mickey Mouse, we fail to serve the mar-
ket for alternative visions of Mickey. 
At the same time, communicative works are not entirely like other consumer products in that 
the experience of some copyrighted works depends on a shared vision of that work, and consum-
ers do seem to derive some value from this.
107
 For example, imagine that J.K. Rowling had not 
had the right to control sequels of her first Harry Potter book.
108
 Others would have written their 
own sequels, based on the popular characters. Although Rowling herself could have proceeded to 
write her own sequels, the singular vision and coherent plot would have been diluted by these 
other versions. Thus, in this instance, some consumers might well prefer to have less choice, less 
variety.  
Although a sustained analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Article, there 
are some initial responses. One answer is that the expiration of the copyright provides one way of 
satisfying both of these interests. It gives copyright owners a period of exclusive control, during 
which they can articulate a coherent and singular vision of that work. Consumers who value this 
can thus satisfy this interest, even though it comes at the expense of consumers who would value 
different visions of that work. Once the copyright term expires, however, the balance shifts, and 
the interests of those with more diverse preferences can be satisfied, at the expense of those who 
prefer a more limited view.
109
 
Another answer is that this may be addressed, even after the expiration of the copyright term, 
through doctrines outside copyright law, such as trademark law. Disney will be able to make its 
own Mickey Mouse movies after the expiration of the copyright, and Disney’s strong trademark 
rights will ensure that consumers can easily choose the version of Mickey authorized by Disney. 
In this way, those who prefer the vision set forth by Disney can still get access to that version, 
even if they will need to screen out the influence of other versions.
110
 
Thus, in the end, the new public domain holds out the potential for a richer and more vital 
realm of free creative play accessible to an unprecedentedly broad range of cultural participants. 
It will be populated by some of the most important and iconic cultural works of the 1920s, 30s, 
and 40s. Access to these works will be free and robust. Moreover, technology will enable a far 
wider range of individuals to access, share, re-cast, and transform these works in new, interesting, 
and unexpected ways. The result is, potentially, an unprecedented level of robust and uninhibited 
creativity. 
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IV. THE PERILS OF THE NEW PUBLIC DOMAIN 
  
Although the end of the term extension freeze holds out the potential of a vital and re-
invigorated public domain in copyright, there is no guarantee that this will come to pass. Indeed, 
there are many legal obstacles that potentially stand in the way. Specifically, the owners of expir-
ing copyrights will look for many ways to limit free use of their works.
 
And existing law is not as 
clear as it could be about precisely what happens to works that pass into the public domain.  
This Part addresses a number of these concerns and attempts to anticipate and resolve some 
of these issues. In particular, this Part takes a look at three main issues: (1) the potential for an-
other term extension; (2) the use of trademark law as a way of limiting free use of public domain 
works; (3) various doctrines in copyright law that may be invoked to limit free use.
 111
 Although 
some of these issues have been addressed in existing case law involving public domain works, the 
scale and significance of the new public domain will put increasing pressure on existing areas of 
doctrinal uncertainty, as well as raise novel legal issues. In each of these areas, this Part offers a 
number of concrete responses to these problems, in order to ensure that the new public domain 
fulfills its promise.  
 
A. Another Term Extension? – Sonny Bono Redux 
 
The first and most immediate threat to the new public domain is, of course, that it may not 
come to pass. This would be so if Congress extends the term of copyright once again, just as it 
did in 1998 and on many previous occasions. If Congress does in fact extend the copyright term 
again, we would face another extended period during which no published works would enter the 
public domain. 
This is not an insignificant risk. On the one hand, the interests opposed to term extension 
have grown stronger in the years since the 1998 term extension. Prior to that debate, these inter-
ests were not very organized, and the general public interest in term extension was limited or 
nonexistent. The term extension debate galvanized many of the interests opposed to extension. 
Moreover, the constitutional challenge to the term extension, and the subsequent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, led to increased visibility for this issue. Finally, as discussed in the preceding sec-
tions, there are more private interests that now have a concrete stake in a robust public domain.
112
 
At the same time, the fundamental public choice issue remains. Companies like Disney derive 
concrete and substantial financial benefits from term extension. As already noted above, Disney 
receives more than $10 billion per year from its rights in Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, Donald 
Duck, Winnie the Pooh, and the rest.
113
 Disney thus stands to lose a tremendous amount if these 
works pass into the public domain. Add that amount to all of the other potential future licensing 
revenues for all other works subject to term extension, and you arrive at a staggering figure.  
Owners of expiring copyrighted works thus have huge incentives to spend tremendous 
amounts of money lobbying for yet another term extension. And while the harm of extension to 
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the public (through raised prices and foregone uses) is significant in the aggregate, it is distributed 
diffusely across many parties and individuals in the public at large, each of whom bears only a 
small fraction of the cost. Thus, public choice theory predicts that it will be more difficult and 
more costly for these interests to organize and oppose the more focused industry interests.
114
  
The discussion in the preceding sections indicates that the potential harm from another term 
extension would be particularly significant. Because of the iconic nature of the works subject to 
the freeze, the foregone value of the public domain during the additional 20 year period may well 
be greater than the foregone value of the public domain from the preceding 20 year period. Thus, 
we cannot measure the value of the foregone public domain from 1923-43 with the value of the 
public domain from 1902-1922. 
Moreover, a real risk exists that, the longer these important works are kept from the public 
domain, the more consumers will view the existing state of affairs as inevitable. Already, the ex-
tremely long term of copyright protection means that the concrete benefits of the public domain 
are relatively diffuse. Most consumers are vaguely aware of a public domain, but think of these 
works in relatively remote terms (e.g. Shakespeare, classical music, etc.). The longer they contin-
ue to think about the public domain in these terms, the less they will be concerned about future 
term extensions, since the benefits of the new potential domain have not yet been realized. The 
public will become accustomed, if it has not already done so, to a world in which Mickey Mouse 
is owned exclusively by Disney, and may soon view this as natural and inevitable.
115
 
Thus, in order for the public domain to play a new and more robust role in the future, any fu-
ture attempt to extend the copyright term retroactively must be defeated. An important part of 
resisting term extension will be to concretely document the harm from another extension. This 
will involve listing the precise works that will be kept from the public domain. This will also in-
volve identifying specific parties that will be harmed by a future extension and obtaining their 
testimony. It will be important to document, in as concrete fashion as possible, the actual losses 
resulting from another term extension. Part of this will also involve summarizing and clearly ar-
ticulating the policy arguments against such an extension. 
An equally important task will be to develop the political support for resisting term extension. 
This will involve identifying public interest groups, libraries, academics, internet companies, and 
many other groups in order to build a robust coalition against term extension. Public attention 
will, of course, be very important, as will communication of these interests to the relevant law-
makers, particularly in districts that have companies that rely upon public domain works.
116
 
 
B. The Trademark Problem – Mickey© vs. Mickey® 
 
Assuming that the copyright term is not extended, the next greatest threat likely comes from 
trademark law. Unlike copyright law, trademark law places no temporal limit on the length of 
protection. Trademark protection lasts as long as the trademark is being used and as long as it 
serves the function of identifying the source of the particular good or service to which it is at-
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 See Liu, supra note ___ (describing the public choice pressures pushing toward term extension); see 
also Yochai Benkler, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND 
FREEDOM (2006) (expressing belief that future extensions will meet more resistance); but see Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Book Review, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472 (2007) (reviewing Benkler and 
expressing more pessimism). 
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 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465 (1994). 
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 See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Beat Should Not Go On: Resisting Early Calls For Further Extensions Of 
Copyright Duration, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 783 (2008); Arlen W. Langvardt, Unwise Or Unconstitutional?: 
The Copyright Term Extension Act, The Eldred Decision, And The Freezing Of The Public Domain For 
Private Benefit, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 193 (2004). 
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tached. Thus, trademark protection can potentially last forever. It is accordingly quite likely that 
owners of soon-expiring copyrights will try to protect their works through trademark law.
117
 
Not all copyrighted works will be entitled to trademark protection.
 118
 Indeed, many if not 
most works will have no trademark significance at all, as they will not have been used to identify 
the source of a good or service. Thus, for example, third-party uses of the movie Gone With the 
Wind or the book The Great Gatsby will probably not raise any trademark concerns.
119
 Other 
works, however, may have trademark significance. For example, United Airlines has prominently 
used George Gershwin’s ―Rhapsody in Blue,‖ in its commercials, and therefore may have trade-
mark rights in the song, as used in connection with airline services. Similarly, certain works of 
visual art may have been used as trademarks, to identify the source of a good or service. 
Take, for example, the case of Mickey Mouse. The pictorial character Mickey Mouse is sub-
ject to copyright protection, which will eventually expire. After that point, Mickey Mouse will 
pass into copyright law’s public domain and be available for others to copy, transform, and make 
derivative works of. At the same time, Disney undoubtedly has trademark rights in the Mickey 
Mouse symbol. Disney uses that symbol to identify its goods, and consumers undoubtedly associ-
ate pictures of Mickey Mouse with the Disney Corporation. Thus, Disney’s trademark rights in 
Mickey Mouse will continue to exist after expiration of the copyright.
120
 
In theory, this overlap of trademark and copyright need not be problematic, since copyright 
and trademark serve different goals.
121
 Trademark law does not provide absolute rights over a 
particular word, logo, or symbol. It does not prevent others from engaging in any and all uses of a 
trademarked symbol. Instead, it only protects against uses that are likely to cause consumer con-
fusion as to the source of a good or service, or to dilute the distinctive character of the particular 
symbol. So even if United Airlines has trademark rights in ―Rhapsody in Blue,‖ it cannot prevent 
a symphony orchestra from performing the song in a concert hall or recording and selling CDs of 
a particular performance. Thus, in theory, trademark does not necessarily stand in the way of free 
use of works that have passed into the public domain. 
                                                 
117
 A number of scholars have written thoughtfully about the nexus between copyright and trademark in the 
specific context of fictional characters passing into the public domain. See, e.g., Leslie A. Kurtz, The Me-
thuselah Factor: When Characters Outlive Their Copyrights, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 437 
(1994) (thoughtful analysis of the trademark implications of expiring copyrights in fictional characters) 
[hereinafter Kurtz, Methuselah]. See also Christine Nickles, The Conflicts Between Intellectual Property 
Protections When A Character Enters The Public Domain, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 133, 168 (1999) [herein-
after Nickles, Conflicts]; Kathryn M. Foley, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining The Elusive Trade-
mark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 932 (2009); Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey 
Mouse is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Lit-
erary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992). The discussion in this Part takes a broader 
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The Copyright Public Domain, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 911 (2003); Laura A. Heymann, The Trade-
mark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55 (2007) (noting increasing overlap of trademark and copyright 
claims). 
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 See, e.g., Nickles, Conflicts supra note __ ,at 168 (1999) (noting the many ways that characters might 
fail to garner trademark protection); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 
1984) (no trademark rights in King Kong). 
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 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding to trademark 
rights in 30 second clip from a public domain Three Stooges film). 
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 See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983) (―We do not 
doubt that the image of a cartoon character and some indicia of that character can function as a trademark 
to identify the source of a work of entertainment‖); DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 
598 F.Supp. 110 (D.C.Ga. 1984) (finding trademark rights in Superman and Wonder Woman characters). 
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 See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, 481 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); cf. Boston Prof'l 
Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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In practice, however, the lines between copyright and trademark are not so clear. This is 
largely due to the systematic expansion of trademark liability over the past several decades. Alt-
hough trademark law was historically a form of consumer protection law, it has evolved in recent 
years to become a broader entitlement. This has been in part a response to the licensing practices 
of trademark owners, who have increasingly placed their trademarks on a wide range of unrelated 
goods. Congress and the courts have, moreover, provided support for this view by expanding the 
substantive scope of trademark law. Thus, a very real possibility exists that owners of expired 
copyrights could use trademark law to restrict free use of these works. 
 
1. Expansive Likelihood of Confusion Claims 
 
Owners of expired copyrights may seek to limit free use of their works through expansive ap-
plications of the basic trademark liability standard: likelihood of consumer confusion. Originally, 
courts interpreted this standard rather narrowly, to apply to confusion by actual purchasers of 
goods with misleading trademarks on them. Over time, however, courts have expanded the nature 
and types of confusion that are potentially subject to trademark liability. Thus, for example, con-
fusion as to endorsement or sponsorship can be a basis for liability. Secondary confusion by third 
parties (i.e. not the purchaser) can be a source of liability.
122
 Even the use of a similar trademark 
to capture the initial interest of a consumer can be the source of liability, even if any such confu-
sion is later dispelled before purchase.
123
  
These expansive understandings of likelihood of confusion pose a risk to the free use of pub-
lic domain works. Imagine, for example, the case of a Mickey Mouse film made, not by Disney, 
but by a third party after the copyright has expried. Disney could claim that the very use of Mick-
ey Mouse in a new movie would likely cause consumer confusion. Disney could argue, quite per-
suasively, that most consumers viewing the Mickey Mouse film would mistakenly believe that 
Disney either created the film or endorsed the film.
124
 Disney might even conduct surveys, which 
could establish actual confusion by consumers. At the very least, Disney could argue that con-
sumers could be initially confused, even if that confusion is later dispelled through a disclaimer. 
If accepted, such a broad understanding of trademark law could effectively gut the ability of third 
parties to make use of certain public domain works, by making it impossible to create and market 
their own works based on the original.  
This concern is not theoretical. Indeed, courts have found potential trademark liability under 
circumstances similar to those described above. In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales,
125
 for 
example, the plaintiff was the publisher of a number of Peter Rabbit books written and illustrated 
by Beatrix Potter. The books and the illustrations had passed into the public domain, and defend-
ants had published their own version of these books, using the same cover illustrations. The plain-
tiff brought a trademark suit, claiming that the defendant’s use of the illustrations infringed on the 
plaintiff’s trademark rights, since consumers could mistakenly believe that defendant’s books 
were published by the plaintiff.  
The court in Warne held that, even though the illustrations and books were in the public do-
main, it was possible that the illustrations had acquired secondary meaning and that defendant’s 
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use of the illustrations could confuse consumers as to the source of the books. In particular, the 
court noted that the public domain status of the illustrations did not prevent them from serving a 
trademark function, and that consumers might well associate the cover illustrations with a particu-
lar publisher of the books. The court thus left open the possibility that defendant’s use of the pub-
lic domain illustrations could lead to a trademark infringement claim. Thus, it is possible that ex-
pansive understandings of trademark law might operate to practically restrict the ability of third 
parties to make use of public domain works. 
This is particularly true of famous and iconic works, such as those that are about to enter the 
public domain. Visual characters such as Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, Donald Duck, Winnie 
the Pooh, Superman, and others are famous and easily recognized around the world. They have 
also been used aggressively by the copyright owners as symbols for identifying products and ser-
vices – i.e. as trademarks. As a result, the public has come to strongly identify these visual char-
acters with a single producer, and that identification has up until now been backed by the force of 
copyright law. Thus, expansive applications of the likelihood of confusion standard are likely to 
find a form of confusion that may be used to justify limitations on third-party use. 
Fortunately, trademark law contains doctrines that, properly understood, stand in the way of 
such a result. Courts have, for many years, been aware of the possibility that an overly expansive 
trademark law would conflict with other areas of intellectual property law. This has been most 
apparent in the area of patent law, where the public domain plays a more immediate role due to 
the far shorter patent term. For example, in National Biscuit v. Kellogg,
126
 the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed a potential conflict between trademark law and patent. In that case, the National 
Biscuit Company had, for many years, exclusively produced its shredded wheat cereal under a 
patent. When the patent expired, a competitor, Kellogg, began making the cereal and selling it 
under the term ―shredded wheat.‖ National Biscuit under unfair competition, arguing that con-
sumers associated the term ―shredded wheat‖ and the particular pillow-shape of the cereal with a 
single producer, namely National Biscuit. 
The Supreme Court rejected National Biscuit’s argument. Interestingly, the Court appeared to 
recognize that consumers might in fact associate the term ―shredded wheat‖ and the pillow shape 
of the cereal with National Biscuit, given National Biscuit’s long period of exclusive use. Never-
theless, the Court found no liability.
127
 The Court pointed to the fact that, the patent having ex-
pired, competitors had the right to make and sell shredded wheat. Along with this right came the 
right to accurately label their product ―shredded wheat.‖128 Any other holding would result in 
trademark law undercutting the purpose of patent law. Thus, courts have recognized that, even in 
cases where some consumer confusion might be possible, trademark law should not be so broadly 
interpreted so as to limit the use of items that other areas of federal law have expressly placed into 
the public domain. 
There is no reason in principle why the same understanding should not be applied to copy-
right law, and indeed, there are recent signs that the Supreme Court takes this point very serious-
ly. In its recent decision in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox,
129
 the U.S. Supreme Court used 
copyright principles to limit the potential scope of trademark law. In Dastar, the plaintiff Twenti-
eth Century Fox originally owned the copyright to a television series about World War II. The 
work passed into the public domain when Fox failed to timely renew the copyright, and the de-
fendant Dastar incorporated much of the Fox footage into its own television series, without cred-
iting Fox. Fox sued under the Lanham Act, alleging that the failure to give Fox credit amounted 
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 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
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 See Graeme Dinwoodie, ―The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis,‖ in 
Jane Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220, 236-39 (2006) 
(noting ambiguities in the Court’s discussion of secondary meaning). 
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 Addresses question re: whether could limit public domain use to visual depiction, but not the name. 
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 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
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to a ―false designation of origin.‖ The Supreme Court in Dastar rejected Fox’s argument and held 
that Dastar was not liable.  
The Court’s opinion is interesting and somewhat odd in a number of ways. In particular, the 
Court drew a distinction between the origin of the physical product (i.e. the video tapes) and the 
copyrighted content (i.e. the footage), and held that the Lanham Act’s protection of consumer 
interests extends only to the physical product. Therefore, according to the Court, there could be 
no false designation of origin in this case, since there was no false labeling of the physical video 
tapes. Some commentators have called into question the factual and doctrinal basis for this dis-
tinction, at least with respect to communicative works such as novels, movies, and the like.
130
 
Nevertheless, the Court also based its opinion on the implications for copyright policy more 
generally. The Court held that such an expansive interpretation of trademark law would have the 
effect of practically hindering the ability of third parties to make use of works that had passed 
into the public domain. The Court noted that a contrary result in Dastar would give rise to a high-
ly uncertain obligation about when individuals had to give credit for public domain materials that 
they incorporated into their own works. This would, in effect, create a ―mutant species‖ of copy-
right law, akin to a moral right of attribution.
131
 Thus, in Dastar, the Court limited the potential 
reach of trademark law through a direct appeal to copyright law policy and the importance of free 
use of public domain materials. 
The reasoning in Dastar would appear to be applicable to other kinds of trademark claims 
based on the use of public domain works.
 132
 An overly expansive interpretation of likelihood of 
confusion would have the effect of limiting the ability of others to make free use of public do-
main works. Thus, courts should be quite hesitant to accept claims that the mere use of a formerly 
copyrighted work would inevitably lead to confusion. In the Mickey Mouse example above, third 
parties should be able to make and sell copies of public domain Mickey Mouse films, as well as 
create their own Mickey Mouse movies, without fear of trademark liability.
133
  
This should be the case even if some consumers mistakenly believe that such movies origi-
nated with, or were endorsed by, Disney. Just as in the National Biscuit case, this mistaken belief 
is based on the fact that the law, for a very long time, gave Disney the exclusive right to make and 
authorize works incorporating Mickey Mouse.
134
 Once Mickey Mouse passes into the public do-
main, this is no longer the case, and competitors are free to make their own Mickey Mouse mov-
ies without Disney’s permission. Such a right would be greatly hindered if Disney could restrict 
such uses through trademark law. Thus, copyright policy and the importance of free competition 
should operate to trump whatever initial confusion might exist among consumers as a result of 
these uses. 
Even if a court believed this kind of confusion was problematic, at most, the appropriate rem-
edy would be a disclaimer, which would address the confusion without limiting the ability of a 
third-party to use the underlying work. Arguments based on disclaimers are not always well-
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received in trademark infringement cases, particularly ones adopting more expansive notions of 
trademark liability such as initial interest confusion. However, where there is a strong independ-
ent interest in promoting free use of a public domain work, a disclaimer should be more than 
enough to address any lingering concerns about confusion. And indeed, Dastar suggests that such 
a disclaimer may not even be necessary. 
To be clear, Disney would still retain rights against uses that are classic trademark uses. So, 
for example, if a third party began selling products using a small picture of Mickey Mouse as a 
logo, Disney would still have the standard trademark claims against that party. If such a use 
caused consumers to mistakenly believe that the product was being sold by Disney, there should 
be a claim for trademark liability. However, Disney would not be able to use an expansive under-
standing of trademark law to prevent what are effectively non-trademark uses of the work, e.g. 
the creation and sale of a new Mickey Mouse movie, the packaging and reselling of an existing 
Mickey Mouse movie, etc.
135
 
The above analysis raises an interesting question about the precise relevance of a work’s pub-
lic domain status in determining questions of likelihood of confusion. In particular, does the 
trademark analysis differ depending on whether the underlying work is in the public domain or 
still protected under copyright? Consider, for example, Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting 
Co.
136
 In that case, the owners of copyright and trademark rights in the characters Superman and 
Wonder Woman brought a lawsuit against proprietors of a singing-telegram company whose em-
ployees dressed up in costumes similar to those of Superman and Wonder Woman. 
The court in that case found the defendants liable for both copyright and trademark infringe-
ment. The depictions of both Superman and Wonder Woman were still under copyright, and 
therefore these uses of those characters infringed upon the copyright owners exclusive rights. 
Moreover, the court held that these uses infringed upon the plaintiff’s trademark rights, since con-
sumers might mistakenly believe that they were authorized by the plaintiff copyright owner. To a 
large extent, this case seems to track instincts about the purpose of trademark law. After all, this 
kind of use does seem quite likely to cause confusion as to the source of the good or service. 
But what would the trademark analysis look like, on the same facts, if Superman and Wonder 
Woman were in the public domain? Does this now change the trademark analysis? One possible 
response would be to treat the case exactly the same, on the grounds that copyright and trademark 
protect independent interests. Thus, the singing telegram company would still be liable. Yet this 
view would seem to be in some tension with a strong understanding of copyright law’s public 
domain, since it would have the effect of limiting free uses of creative works that are no longer 
protected. Once these characters are in the public domain, presumably other people should be 
able to make, sell, and perform in their own Superman and Wonder Woman costumes. 
The above scenario indicates that the public domain status of the underlying copyright is do-
ing real work in affecting how we see the trademark analysis. It is not true that copyright and 
trademark are conceptually entirely distinct, and that we can therefore feel comfortable analyzing 
the trademark claims independently, without looking to copyright policy. Rather, just as the U.S. 
Supreme Court did in both Dastar and National Biscuit, courts interpreting trademark claims 
based on formerly-copyrighted works or formerly-patented products must take into account copy-
right and patent policies in an express fashion. 
This, in turn, suggests that prior case law that finds trademark infringement based on the use 
of copyrighted characters or materials should be treated carefully when applied to copyrighted 
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material that has passed into the public domain.
137
 It is possible that these cases are wrongly de-
cided, insofar as there should only be copyright liability and not trademark liability, even in cases 
where the underlying work is still under copyright. To some extent, the ready availability of cop-
yright liability in these cases lessens the pressure on the trademark issue, since the scope of copy-
right protection is often (though not always) greater. Thus, we might view these cases as wrongly 
decided based on an insufficiently careful and attentive parsing of the proper scope of copyright 
and trademark.
 138
 
Alternatively, these cases can be distinguished based on the fact that, for the copyrighted 
works, copyright law in fact gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to use the work, and 
therefore consumer expectations are backed by the force of law. Conversely, when a work has 
passed into the public domain, there is no longer any legal basis for these expectations. Further-
more, the strong copyright interest in free use precludes the application of trademark liability. 
Unlike the cases where the work is still under copyright, once the work is in the public domain, 
there is a strong copyright interest in free use. Accordingly, there are good reasons for treating the 
public domain examples differently.
139
 
In the end, there are doctrines in trademark law that, properly understood, prevent former 
copyright owners from using expansive understandings of likelihood of confusion to bar third 
parties completely from engaging in these uses of their works. In order for the public domain to 
fulfill its purpose, courts must be conscious of the potential conflict between trademark and copy-
right and be careful to police this boundary, as they have in the past. Thus, third parties should, 
consistent with a sound understanding of the limits of trademark law, be able to exercise their 
right to use public domain works freely.  
 
2. Merchandising Claims 
 
Even if courts recognize (as they should) that important copyright interests should operate to 
limit expansive likelihood of confusion claims, there may still be some uncertainty about precise-
ly what kinds of uses invoke copyright interests, as opposed to trademark interests. For example, 
in the case of the new Mickey Mouse film, the divide between copyright and trademark is rela-
tively clear, as the example involved a use that clearly fell within the core of copyright. Similarly, 
the use of a small Mickey Mouse symbol as a trademark falls comfortably within the scope of 
trademark, and raises few copyright concerns.  
But what about uses that fall in between? For example, imagine that a third party produces, 
not a Mickey Mouse movie, but a Mickey Mouse suitcase? The visual depiction of the Mickey 
Mouse character on the suitcase would give rise to no copyright liability once the work is in the 
public domain. But would Disney have a trademark claim? What about a t-shirt with a large pic-
ture of Mickey Mouse? Or other Mickey Mouse merchandise, like a stuffed animal? 
Here, copyright runs into another area of expanding trademark liability, namely merchandis-
ing. Over the past several decades, trademark owners have increasingly used their marks, not only 
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to identify the source of their goods, but as marketable goods in and of themselves.
140
 They do so 
by attaching their marks to unrelated goods and merchandise, such as t-shirts, clothing, fashion 
items, etc. Moreover, consumers have evinced an increasing interest in purchasing such goods, 
based on the existence of the trademark itself and the communicative impact of the trademark. 
Thus, for example, a consumer might purchase a t-shirt or cap with the Red Sox logo, not because 
she believes the major league baseball team makes particularly good t-shirts or caps, but because 
of the presence of the symbol itself and the significant informational investments in that symbol 
that the Red Sox have made over the years. Again, this is a particular concern for some of the 
iconic works about to pass into the public domain, as the copyright owners have aggressively 
marketed merchandise based on these works. 
This kind of use does not fit easily within the traditional framework of trademark law, as it is 
a fundamentally different kind of use, and the precise doctrinal basis for this kind of claim is not 
entirely clear. In these cases, the mark may be serving some source-identifying function, but that 
function seems secondary to its communicative function. Nevertheless, trademark owners have 
increasingly engaged in these kinds of uses, and some courts have been willing to recognize ex-
clusive rights over these uses, under expansive notions of likelihood of confusion or dilution.
141
 
Although the use of public domain works in this fashion – i.e. on t-shirts, posters, and other 
merchandise – sits uneasily between copyright and trademark, courts should err on the side of 
finding these uses by third parties privileged in cases involving public domain works. They 
should do so for two reasons: (1) the weak nature of the trademark interest; and (2) the im-
portance of preserving a robust public domain.  
Taking the second of these reasons first, the public domain interest in free use of images of 
Mickey Mouse and other similar creative works is extremely strong. Once Mickey Mouse passes 
into the public domain, copyright law principles clearly require that others be free to make and 
sell works based upon the character. These uses will quite logically include representations be-
yond simply making new Mickey Mouse films or stories. These uses will include other derivative 
works, such as posters, figurines, stuffed animals, and the like. If these uses were automatically 
deemed to be trademark violations, this would greatly undercut the ability of third parties to make 
use of these public domain works.
142
 
 Moreover, the countervailing trademark interest in these cases is more attenuated. It is im-
portant to note at the outset that these uses are not traditional trademark uses. We are not talking 
about the use of a small Mickey Mouse logo on the label of a shirt, to identify the source as Dis-
ney. Instead, Mickey Mouse itself is the product. Consumers are purchasing the stuffed animal or 
t-shirt, not because the image denotes the source as Disney, but because of its communicative 
function, its content. This interest is at the core of copyright law, not trademark law. The wide-
spread and lower-cost dissemination of such public domain works is precisely one of the benefits 
of a work’s passage into the public domain. Thus, to the extent that consumers purchase a good 
because of the public domain content, these uses should fall outside the scope of trademark law.
 
143
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merchandising is the prime example. Consumers buy the product because of the character rather than the 
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What about the argument that consumers will, as a factual matter, associate this kind of mer-
chandise specifically with Disney? Even though a broad merchandising right rests on somewhat 
uncertain legal ground,
144
 it is probably true that many consumers in fact believe that such uses 
are exclusive.
145
 Thus, if a third party, after the expiration of the copyright term, made Mickey 
Mouse t-shirts, it is quite possible that a consumer survey would indicate that most consumers 
believed that the t-shirt was made by Disney. Is this not a classic trademark harm? 
Once again, courts should recognize that some initial amount of confusion may need to be 
suffered in order to ensure that works in the public domain can be freely used. In National Bis-
cuit, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that some consumers might indeed associate the term 
―shredded wheat‖ with the National Biscuit, due to the long period of exclusive use, but ultimate-
ly found this trumped by the need for free competition. Similarly, any initial association with 
Disney, due to its lengthy period of exclusive use, should be trumped by the need for free use of 
public domain works.
146
 
In addition, the strength of this association will diminish over time, as consumers become ac-
customed to the wide availability of Mickey Mouse merchandise from third parties.
147
 One reason 
consumers have such an association is because Disney and other companies have enjoyed such a 
lengthy period of exclusive use, protected by copyright law. Thus, consumers have assumed a 
single source because copyright law ensured that this was the case (just as patent law did in the 
National Biscuit case). Once third-parties begin exercising their public domain rights, consumers 
will adjust their expectations.
148
 Moreover, any initial confusion could be dispelled by the judi-
cious use of disclaimers.
149
 
A good example of an appropriately limited understanding of trademark law in this context 
can be found in the Ninth Circuit panel’s initial decision in the recent case, Fleischer Studios v. 
A.V.E.L.A.
150
 In Fleischer Studios, a panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected a trademark claim brought 
by the alleged owners of the trademark rights in the cartoon character Betty Boop, against de-
fendants who had sold t-shirts, posters, and other paraphernalia with the cartoon image. The court 
noted that consumers purchasing merchandise with the Betty Boop image were purchasing it, not 
                                                                                                                                                 
manufacturer. Once copyright no longer protects such use, the burden is on the plaintiff to overcome the 
presumption of adornment and prove that a significant number of consumers utilize the character as a true 
trademark‖). Note that Helfand would make an exception for marks that are so famous and iconic that inev-
itably associated with source, e.g. Mickey Mouse. This would appear to be a major restriction in the public 
domain status. See Kurtz, Methuselah, supra note __ , at __ (rejecting this view). 
144
 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note __. 
145
 See Kurtz, Methuselah, supra note __, at 444 (―Several courts have noted that the public has come to 
expect the exploitation and licensing of well-known characters.‖); Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus, supra 
note __ (citing study); Kozinski, Mickey & Me, supra note __. 
146
 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983) (acknowledging the pos-
sibility that some consumers may be confused, but nevertheless refusing to find trademark liability because 
―[o]therwise the scope of protection a competitor is entitled to enjoy would be expanded far beyond what 
Congress prescribed in the Lanham Act‖). 
147
 See Kurtz, Methuselah, supra note __, at 446 (―If others were permitted to offer unauthorized merchan-
dise, so that a variety of versions competed for public acceptance, the perception that all such products are 
sponsored would be undercut.‖). 
148
 A good analogy to this phenomenon can be found in the case of private label goods. Retail stores often 
sell their own private label goods in competition with branded goods, and in so doing, often adopted a very 
similar trade dress to the private label goods. Courts have generally been quite accepting of these similari-
ties, despite the potential for some amount of confusion. Over time, consumers have been accustomed to 
similarities in trade dress, and have therefore adjusted their expectations. Note also: private labeling cases 
and the focus on free competition. Note also circularity of consumer expectations and the importance of 
establishing entitlement right away. 
149
 See Kurtz, Methuselah, supra note __, at 451 (suggesting disclaimers as the proper potential remedy). 
150
 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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because of the source-denoting function of Betty Boop, but rather because of the image itself. The 
court expressly held that this kind of ―functional‖ use of an alleged trademark fell outside of the 
scope of trademark law.
151
 In addition, the court, citing the Supreme Court’s Dastar opinion, not-
ed that a contrary result would effectively limit the ability of third parties to make use of works 
that had passed into copyright’s public domain.152  
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit panel’s initial decision in Fleischer was later vacated and 
superseded by the same panel.
153
 In the superseding opinion, the panel no longer advanced its 
previous argument based on functionality (which the panel had apparently raised sua sponte), but 
instead focused on whether the plaintiff in Fleischer had established secondary meaning with re-
spect to the Betty Boop character. On this score, the panel remanded for additional development 
of the record. Thus, the relevant portion of the initial opinion has unfortunately been vacated. 
Nevertheless, that initial panel decision in Fleischer provides a model for future cases limit-
ing the potential reach of overly-expansive merchandising claims. The panel’s initial decision 
was correct in noting that such uses of public domain works sit properly within the scope of copy-
right law, not trademark law, because they are ultimately communicative uses.
154
 Consumers pur-
chase this merchandise primarily based on the content of the work, not based on its source-
identifying function. The opinion suggests that courts can police this line by invoking trademark 
law’s functionality doctrine, which bars trademark law from protecting aspects of a trademark 
(typically trade dress or product design) that are functional or utilitarian. A number of courts have 
extended this doctrine to apply to aesthetically functional aspects of a trademark, i.e. cases where 
the appeal of the trademark goes beyond its source identifying function.
155
 The initial Fleischer 
opinion indicates that this doctrine can play a more important role in the future, as more such 
copyrighted works pass into the public domain. 
 
 3. Dilution Claims 
 
 Finally, courts will need to resolve potential conflicts between copyright policy and trade-
mark dilution. In addition to the traditional cause of action for likelihood of confusion, federal 
law recognizes a cause of action for dilution for famous marks, either through blurring or tar-
nishment.
156
 A use of a famous mark blurs that mark when it lessens the distinctive character of 
the mark. So, for example, if I sell Nike ball bearings, even though consumers are unlikely to be 
confused as to the source of those ball bearings, this use may weaken the uniqueness of the Nike 
mark. A use of a famous mark tarnishes that mark when it harms the reputation of the mark, typi-
cally through use on an unseemly or inferior product. So, for example, if I open a Nike strip club, 
again there will be little confusion, but there may be harm to the reputation of the mark. 
Owners of expiring copyrights may attempt to use these doctrines to further limit use of their 
works. So, for example, if a third party made a pornographic Mickey Mouse film, Disney could 
bring a lawsuit for dilution, either through blurring (i.e. arguing that this use dilutes the distinctive 
                                                 
151
 See also International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.1980). But 
see Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). 
152
 ―If we ruled that A.V.E.L.A.'s depictions of Betty Boop infringed Fleischer's trademarks, the Betty Boop 
character would essentially never enter the public domain.‖ See also Foley, Fictional Characters, supra 
note __, at 932 (suggesting a division based on Dastar’s distinction between source of physical product and 
communicative content). 
153
 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 3633512 (9th Cir. 2011). 
154
 See Kurtz, Methuselah, supra note __, at 444 (―It must be recognized, however, that the law of trade-
marks and unfair competition is being used to protect the expressive elements of a character as well as its 
ability to denote its source.‖); Helfand, Mickey Mouse, supra note  __, at 667 (arguing in favor of a clearer 
distinction between copyright and trademark uses, in the context of fictional characters). 
155
 See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.1980). 
156
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
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character of the mark) or through tarnishment (i.e. by harming the reputation of the mark). And 
such a claim would not be without basis, as it is not hard to believe that, even if there were no 
confusion as to source, such a use would, in fact, make the trademark Mickey Mouse both less 
distinct and less reputable.
157
 
Once again, however, such a result would impose a significant limitation on the public do-
main. These kinds of uses would clearly be privileged under copyright law once the work passes 
into the public domain. Moreover, from a policy standpoint, the recasting and re-use of formerly 
copyrighted works in new and different ways, even and perhaps especially ways that the former 
owners object to, is precisely one of the key and important benefits of the public domain. This is 
particularly the case, given the iconic status of the new public domain works, along with the in-
creased potential, afforded by technology, for many individuals to participate creatively in such 
re-casting and re-use. Thus, if trademark dilution were interpreted in such a broad fashion, it 
would have the potential to hinder these benefits. 
Fortunately, trademark law once again contains doctrines that could (and should) be inter-
preted to prevent such a result. In particular, dilution law contains exceptions for non-commercial 
and fair uses.
158
 The uses noted above are quite likely non-commercial uses. Even though they 
might well be commercial in a literal sense (in that the creators of the movie intend to make mon-
ey), courts have interpreted the term ―non-commercial‖ to apply to uses that are communicative, 
rather than purely trademark-related.
159
 Thus, it is quite likely that these uses would fall outside 
the scope of a dilution claim, at least properly understood. Moreover, to the extent that there is 
any ambiguity about this, the policies underlying the public domain should prompt courts to err 
on the side of no liability.
160
 
Companies would still be able to maintain dilution claims, but only in a limited fashion that 
does not implicate these broader concerns. So, for example, if a company used a small picture of 
Mickey Mouse as a logo for selling ball bearings, or as a logo for a strip club, these would be 
classic trademark uses. Preventing these uses would raise little concern about interference with 
the public domain. Disney would not, however, be able to deploy dilution claims to restrict uses 
that fall within the scope of copyright law, i.e. that are communicative in nature. 
 
* * * 
 
Thus, in the end, the potential exists for trademark law to limit the benefits of a robust public 
domain. At the same time, courts have the tools and doctrines to interpret trademark law in a way 
that limits these encroachments. Some of these doctrines are internal to trademark law itself. 
However, the consistent pattern of relatively unthinking expansion of trademark law by the courts 
in the past suggests it would be unwise to rely solely on these internal doctrines. Instead, courts 
should supplement these doctrines with a strong understanding of the preemptive scope of copy-
right law’s public domain. The importance of the public domain in copyright law is relatively 
easy to grasp and can serve (as it has already done so in past cases) as a concrete counterweight to 
expansive notions of trademark liability.  
                                                 
157
 See, e.g., Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1341, 1343-44 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoining third 
party from making unauthorized James Bond film because such a film would lead to dilution of trademark 
rights); Brown v. It's Entm't, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (enjoining unlicensed uses of 
costumed Arthur Aardvark character, on the grounds that such uses would lead to dilution). 
158
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
159
 See, e.g., Mattel v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Louis Vuitton Malletier v. 
Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F. 3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
160
 See generally, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses In Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 99 (2009); but see Kristen Knudsen, Note, Tomorrow Never Dies: The Protection of James Bond and 
Other Fictional Characters Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 2 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 13, 23 
(2000) (arguing broadly in favor of dilution protection for fictional characters). 
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Courts can use these understandings to develop clearer lines between the source-identifying 
uses of trademarks and more communicative uses that properly belong in the realm of copy-
right.
161
 In the past, courts have not had to draw such fine distinctions, as many of the works sub-
ject to potential expansive trademark protection were already protected by copyright law. In the 
future, however, as more iconic works enter the public domain, courts will be asked to draw 
clearer lines between the realms of trademark and copyright. In so doing, they can rely on both 
internal trademark doctrines (such as functionality and trademark use) and better understandings 
of copyright law’s public domain.162 
 
C. The Copyright Problem – Mickey vs. Steamboat Willie 
 
Another set of challenges to the new public domain comes from within copyright law itself. 
Copyright law is quite clear about the immediate consequences of a work passing into the public 
domain: third parties are completely free to make copies of that work, sell it, perform it in public, 
make derivative works based upon it, etc. Thus, once The Great Gatsby goes into the public do-
main, I can sell copies of it, write a sequel to it, make a movie based upon it, all without fear of 
copyright liability. Still, a number of wrinkles in copyright doctrine raise issues about the precise 
scope of these rights at the margin, and we can expect former owners of expired copyrights to 
attempt to assert these claims. Courts will thus need to keep clearly in mind, when deciding these 
cases, the importance of making sure that third parties can freely access and use works that have 
passed into the public domain. 
 
1. Tracing Multiple Versions of Works 
 
One complication arises from the fact that copyright owners may, in some cases, have created 
multiple versions of a creative work at different time periods. Thus, there may be questions about 
what, precisely, passes into the public domain and at what time. In the discussion above, we have 
largely assumed that there is a single version of Mickey Mouse that will pass into the public do-
main on January 1, 2024. In fact, however, the visual depiction of Mickey Mouse has changed 
significantly over time. The first widespread public appearance of Mickey Mouse occurred in 
1928, in the black and white cartoon Steamboat Willie. The character Steamboat Willie, though 
similar to the modern depiction of Mickey Mouse, differs in important ways. In addition to being 
black and white (as opposed to in color), Steamboat Willie is more mouse-like and less cartoon-
like, with smaller ears, hands, feet and eyes.
163
 Moreover, his actions in the film Steamboat Willie 
indicate that he is a mischievous character, unlike the friendly, unthreatening Mickey Mouse of 
today.
164
 
                                                 
161
 See Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. Rev. 55 (2007) (arguing for 
clearer dividing line). Because of the long period of copyright protection, courts have not had as much of 
an opportunity to develop this line. 
162
 Note that there may also be an impact in limiting overly-expansive trademark claims for works still sub-
ject to copyright. 
163
 See  Claire Suddath, ―A Brief History of Mickey Mouse,‖ TIME (Nov. 18, 2008) (describing changes to 
Mickey Mouse over time) available at http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1859935,00.html. 
164
 See Kurtz, Methuselah, supra note __, at 447-48 (―When Mickey Mouse made his debut in Steamboat 
Willie in 1928, he was a ―rambunctious, even a slightly sadistic fellow.‖); ―The Evolution of Mickey 
Mouse,‖ at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-JIMBG_7S3A; Stephen Jay Gould, ―A Biological Homage 
to Mickey Mouse,‖ in THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 89 (1980) (―Mick-
ey, however, has traveled this ontogenetic pathway in reverse during fifty years among us. He has assumed 
an ever more childlike appearance as the ratty character of Steamboat Willie became the cute and inoffen-
sive host to a magic kingdom‖). See also Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, 
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In light of this fact, what aspects of Mickey Mouse will pass into the public domain in 2024? 
The short and easy answer is the version that was created in 1928, namely Steamboat Willie. Be-
cause the copyright term for works created prior to the 1976 Act was measured from the date of 
publication, only the work that was published in 1928 will expire in 2024. Thus, as of that later 
date, third-parties will be able to distribute copies of the film Steamboat Willie, sell posters fea-
turing pictures of Steamboat Willie, and make their own movies using the visual depiction of 
Steamboat Willie. 
What about later, more modern depictions of Mickey Mouse? Will third parties be able to 
make copies of the later versions of Mickey Mouse in 2024? Probably not. A later, changed ver-
sion of the Mickey Mouse character would probably be a derivative work, and under general cop-
yright law principles, the derivative work would be entitled to a separate copyright covering any 
additional original content. Thus, while Disney would not be able to prevent use of elements of 
the character that had passed into the public domain with Steamboat Willie, Disney would be able 
to protect the additional original expression in the new version, at least until that new version it-
self passes into the public domain.
165
 
A nice example of this basic result can be found in Silverman v. CBS,
166
 which involved the 
popular Amos n Andy radio show. The show was first created in 1928 and broadcast on radio 
through the early 1950s. A television show based on the characters was broadcast from 1951-53. 
In 1981, Silverman, a playwright, planned to create a musical based on the Amos n Andy charac-
ters, and sought a declaratory judgment establishing his right to do so. Silverman based his claim 
on the fact that the copyrights in the pre-1948 radio scripts had expired due to failure to renew. 
However, CBS still owned valid copyrights in the post-1948 radio scripts as well as the television 
shows.  
The court ultimately held that Silverman could use all of the elements of the pre-1948 radio 
scripts. These included the characters Amos and Andy, as delineated in those radio scripts, since 
the court found that these earlier scripts in fact provided sufficient details about the two charac-
ters so as to put them broadly in the public domain. However, the court also held that Silverman 
could not make use of any further delineation of those characters that appeared in any of the post-
1948 works still under copyright, to the extent such additional delineations were sufficiently orig-
                                                                                                                                                 
Derivative Works, And The Copyright Act Of 1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254 (2003) (arguing that 
Steamboat Willie may already be in public domain due to failure to comply with formalities). 
165
 See Scott M. Martin, The Mythology Of The Public Domain: Exploring The Myths Behind Attacks On 
The Duration Of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (2002) (using this distinction to argue 
that Disney will not be appreciably harmed upon the passing of Steamboat Willie into the public domain). 
166
 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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inal. In particular, to the extent that the television shows provided any additional visual depictions 
of the characters, beyond those already described in the public domain scripts, these depictions 
could not be used.
167
 
Thus, the Silverman case provides a nice illustration of the kind of careful parsing that courts 
will need to engage in, in order to separate out the unprotected elements of earlier public domain 
works from the additional originality found in later, still-protected works. The Silverman court 
itself expressly noted that such an inquiry, though easy in principle, may at times be difficult in 
practice, as it involves careful tracing of the source of particular original contributions. However, 
the basic idea is relatively straightforward. 
Although the basic understanding is relatively clear-cut, one interesting question has to do 
with whether the new versions are sufficiently original to warrant protection as a derivative work. 
In other words, are the differences between the original visual depiction of Steamboat Willie and 
the more modern Mickey Mouse enough to give rise to a separate copyright? In general, the 
threshold for originality in copyright is quite low. Accordingly, it is quite possible that a court 
would find enough additional originality in the new version of Mickey Mouse so as to lead to a 
separate copyright. Under this view, only the earlier Steamboat Willie would pass into the public 
domain in 2024. 
At the same time, there is some copyright case law that lends support to a heightened origi-
nality requirement for derivative works. For example, in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,
168
 the 
plaintiff Gracen entered a contest by submitting a drawing of a scene from the movie The Wizard 
of Oz. The copyright owner of the movie, MGM, authorized the contest and therefore gave Gra-
cen permission to create this work. The contest specifically asked contestants to provide their 
own interpretation of the movie, and Gracen produced a drawing of Dorothy, based on a scene 
from the movie. Later, a dinnerware company copied Gracen’s drawing and placed it on dinner 
plates without her permission. Gracen sued, alleging copyright infringement. 
In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Gracen’s claim, 
finding that she had no copyright in her drawing. The court held that Gracen’s drawing was not 
sufficiently original to qualify for protection, despite the fact that Gracen had clearly added her 
own artistic interpretation in creating her picture. Judge Posner wrote that a somewhat higher 
standard of originality applied to derivative works because of potential difficulties in establishing 
proof of copying. If a derivative work resembles the original too closely, then it may be difficult 
for a particular copyright owner to establish that an alleged infringer copied from one work as 
opposed to the other. In order to avoid this result, Posner suggested that a higher degree of origi-
nality applied to derivative works. 
Gracen holds out the possibility that small modifications of earlier copyrighted works may 
not be sufficiently original to warrant separate copyright protection. Thus, in the Mickey Mouse 
example, there is a possible argument that later visual depictions of Mickey Mouse do not contain 
sufficient additional originality to warrant separate protection. This result would be justified by 
the same policy rationale stated in Gracen, namely that it would otherwise be difficult to establish 
whether the defendant copied from the public domain version or the later derivative version. Un-
der this view, once Steamboat Willie passes into the public domain, many (and perhaps all) later 
visual depictions of Mickey Mouse would also pass into the public domain, since there would not 
be enough additional originality to sustain a new copyright. Thus, third parties would be free to 
make and sell copies of all versions of Mickey Mouse. 
                                                 
167
 Compare Warner Bros. v. X One X Productions, No. 10-1743 (8th Cir. July 5, 2011) (―a book’s descrip-
tion of a character generally anticipates very little of the expression of the character in film‖).  
168
 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). 
DRAFT: 9/9/11 THE NEW PUBLIC DOMAIN PAGE 37 
 
Posner’s opinion in Gracen is controversial and has not been accepted by all courts.169 In-
deed, a number of other courts reject the higher standard for derivative works, and would thus 
apply largely the same standard of originality that applies to new works. Thus, it is quite possible 
that many courts would find sufficient originality in the later versions of Mickey Mouse. Moreo-
ver, even under the heightened standard in Gracen, the newer version of Mickey Mouse may be 
sufficiently original. In any event, this at least highlights one of the complications that may arise 
when there are different versions of copyrighted works published at different times. Courts will 
have to sort through the different versions and establish if and when a new version of a work adds 
enough originality to warrant separate copyright protection.  
Moreover, even if later versions are separately copyrighted, there may arise the tricky ques-
tions of proof identified by Judge Posner in Gracen. It may, in some cases, be difficult to estab-
lish whether an alleged infringer copied from the public domain version or a later version still 
subject to copyright.
170
 To some extent, these are simply issues of fact that will need to be estab-
lished at trial. At the same time, the difficulties of establishing provenance may have a practical 
impact on the ability to use works that are ostensibly in the public domain.
171
 Thus, there may 
well be complications associated with tracing specific versions of works. 
Although the above example uses a work of visual art, the problem with multiple versions 
applies to other works as well. For example, imagine that a novel was published in 1923 and 
passes into the public domain in 2019. Imagine that a sequel to the novel was published in 1925. 
When the first novel passes into the public domain in 2019, does anything from the 1925 sequel 
also pass into the public domain? Upon initial inspection, the answer seems clear – only the 1923 
novel passes into the public domain. Thus, while third parties could distribute copies of the 1923 
novel or write their own sequels to that novel, the 1925 novel will remain protected for an addi-
tional two years. 
But what about fictional events from the 1925 novel? For example, say I write my own novel 
using characters, events, and the world from the 1923 novel. But I also assume, in my new novel, 
events from the 1925 novel. I do not reproduce any of the text from the later novel. Nor do I ex-
pressly incorporate any significant portions of the plot of that novel. But I assume that the events 
in my novel occur after the events of the 1925 novel, so reference those facts in my novel. I also 
assume that the characters have changed (whether physically or emotionally) due to these events. 
Have I infringed upon the later novel? 
To make this more concrete, consider the case of Sherlock Holmes, the famous detective cre-
ated by Arthur Conan Doyle in a series of stories published from 1887 to 1930. Most of these sto-
ries were published before 1923 and are therefore in the public domain.
172
 However, several sto-
ries were published after 1923, and therefore remain under copyright.
173
 Since the basic charac-
                                                 
169
 Compare Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Montgomery v. Noga, 168 
F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). 
170
 See, e.g., Ty v. GMA Accessories, 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.). See also Douglas Licht-
man, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003). This is made even more complicated by 
the fact that unconscious copying may lead to liability. See Bright Tunes v. Harrisongs, 420 F. Supp. 177 
(S.D. N.Y. 1976). Given the iconic status of some of these public domain works, it may be difficult to 
counter the argument that any similarities with later works was due to unconscious copying. 
171
 For example, Paul Heald very nicely documented the issues that confront choir directors who have to 
deal with copyright claims based on minimal changes to public domain music. Paul J. Heald, Reviving The 
Rhetoric Of The Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, And New Arrangements Of Public Do-
main Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996). 
172
 The character first appeared in A STUDY IN SCARLET (1887).  
173
 Post 1923 works include: THE ADVENTURE OF THE SUSSEX VAMPIRE (1924); THE ADVENTURE OF THE 
THREE GARRIDEBS (1924); THE ADVENTURE OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS CLIENT (1924); THE ADVENTURE OF THE 
RETIRED COLOURMAN (1926); THE ADVENTURE OF THE LION'S MANE (1926); THE ADVENTURE OF THE 
BLANCHED SOLDIER (1926); and THE ADVENTURE OF THE THREE GABLES (1926). 
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ters Sherlock Holmes, Dr. Watson, and the rest, appeared in many pre-1923 works, they are in the 
public domain. Therefore, I am free to write my own Sherlock Holmes stories based on those 
characters. However, can I reference fictional events from the post-1923 stories?
174
  
Again, the answer here is easy in theory but tricky in practice. The answer depends on wheth-
er, by incorporating these events into my novel, I have infringed upon any original expression in 
the 1925 work. This, in turn, depends on whether those events are sufficiently original. Although 
facts are not eligible for copyright protection, some ambiguity exists over so-called ―created 
facts,‖ such as fictional events in creative works.175 Does a single fictional event have enough 
creativity such that merely by invoking it, I infringe? Even if a single fictional event cannot be 
protected, what about a collection of such events? Does this begin to approach the plot of the 
novel? There is some case law that supports protection for aggregations of such fictional 
events.
176
 Thus, there will probably be some ambiguity regarding the elements of later versions 
that may or may not be incorporated into new creative works.  
The recent case Warner Bros. Entertainment v. X One X Productions highlights offers some 
reasons for concern.
177
 In that case, the plaintiff owned the copyright in the movie The Wizard of 
Oz. Before the movie was finished, however, promotional photographs were taken of the movie 
actors in costume (i.e. dressed as Dorothy, the Tin Man, the Scarecrow) on the set of the movie. 
These photographs were distributed publicly without any copyright notice and therefore passed 
into the public domain. The defendant in the case extracted images of the characters from the 
public domain photographs and authorized their use on products such as posters, t-shirts, lunch 
boxes, etc. Sometimes, these images would be accompanied by other background images (e.g. the 
Yellow Brick Road) or signature phrases from the underlying book (e.g. ―There’s no place like 
home.‖). In other cases, the defendant authorized the creation of three-dimensional figurines 
based on the public domain images. 
The Eighth Circuit panel in the case held that the defendant could continue selling products 
containing literal reproductions of the public domain photographs (e.g. posters, t-shirts, and the 
like). However, the panel enjoined sale of the three-dimensional products as well as the products 
that combined separate elements, such as the images and the phrases. In reaching this result, the 
court held that, although the underlying images were in the public domain, the transformation of 
those images, by either rendering them three-dimensional or combining them with phrases from 
the books, infringed upon the additional originality contained in the still-copyrighted movies.  
The opinion in X One X highlights some of the complications and concerns that arise when 
trying to trace the precise inputs to creative works. While the court was certainly correct that 
some uses of the public domain images could go so far as to infringe upon the copyright in the 
film, the court interpreted the right to use the public domain images very narrowly. At the same 
time, the court advanced a very expansive understanding of the additional protectable originality 
in the later film. The court attributed nearly all the defendant’s creative additions as deriving from 
additional originality contained in the movie. And it did so without carefully looking at whether 
these additional elements were sufficiently original to warrant protection, or whether they flowed 
logically and obviously from the underlying image itself.  
For example, it is hard to see how the combination of two public domain elements, the pic-
ture of Dorothy and the phrase ―There’s no place like home‖ from the underlying book, infringed 
upon any protectable originality found in the movie. Similarly, it is hard to see how simply turn-
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 This was essentially the situation presented in Pannonia Farms v. U.S.A. Cable, 2004 WL 1276842, at 9 
& n.20 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004). The case is discussed in more detail in the following section. 
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 See Justin Hughes, Created Facts And The Flawed Ontology Of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 43 (2007); CDN v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999); Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
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 Cite. 
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 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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ing the public domain photograph into a three-dimensional figure infringed upon protectable ex-
pression from the film. The net effect of the court’s decision was to limit use of the public domain 
materials to narrowly literal reproductions, and to significantly disable others from using such 
materials in a more creative fashion. Thus, in tracing the provenance of particular aspects of a 
work, the risk exists that too narrow a definition of the public domain work, and too expansive a 
definition of the still-protected work, may operate to unduly restrict the ability to creatively re-use 
and re-imagine the public domain works. 
The concerns raised above suggest that courts, when dealing with multiple versions of works, 
some of which are copyrighted and some of which are not, need to be particularly careful to make 
sure that third parties have full and free rights to use the materials that have in fact passed into the 
public domain. Part of this will involve carefully examining the works still under copyright, trac-
ing the elements that are truly new, and making sure that these new elements (whether they be 
facts, ideas, plots, etc.) are sufficiently original to warrant protection. In making this determina-
tion, courts should be particularly attuned to the need to encourage free use of public domain 
works. 
 
 2. The Uncertain Scope of Characters 
 
In a related fashion, there may also be significant uncertainty regarding precisely which fea-
tures of a fictional character have entered the public domain. Up to now, we have spoken rather 
loosely about copyright protection for characters, assuming that there is a clear definition of what 
aspects of a character copyright law protects. Yet this is anything but clear. What, precisely, 
about a fictional character is protected? What, precisely, enters the public domain when that char-
acter passes into the public domain? For visual works, this is perhaps somewhat easier, as we can 
focus on a particular visual depiction of that character, for example Steamboat Willie. But what 
about the non-visual aspects of these characters? For example, what about their characteristics 
and the events in their lives? What about pure literary characters? 
To some extent, these uncertainties track the uncertain scope of copyright protection for char-
acters more generally. Although many courts have held that fictional characters can sometimes be 
protected by copyright, it is not entirely clear what, if anything, about characters can be protected 
outside of the specific copyrighted works in which they appear.
 178
 After all, ―fictional characters‖ 
do not appear as a separate category of works protected under the Copyright Act. And indeed, 
characters fit somewhat uneasily within the scope of copyright, as they also invoke aspects of 
trademark law. Many other articles have attempted to address some of these uncertainties, and a 
comprehensive look at the scope of copyright protection for characters is beyond the scope of this 
Article.
179
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 See, e.g., Foley, Fictional Characters, supra note __, at 932 (describing different standards courts have 
laid out for protecting characters under copyright). 
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 See, e.g., Kurtz, Methuselah, supra note __; Leslie Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional 
Characters, 1986 WISC. L. REV. 429; Helfand, Mickey Mouse, supra note __; Kristen Knudsen, Note, To-
morrow Never Dies: The Protection of James Bond and Other Fictional Characters Under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 13, 23 (2000); Laurie Richter, Note, Reproductive 
Freedom: Striking A Fair Balance Between Copyright And Other Intellectual Property Protections In Car-
toon Characters, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 441 (2009); Gregory S. Schienke, Comment, The Spawn Of 
Learned Hand-A Reexamination Of Copyright Protection And Fictional Characters: How Distinctly Delin-
eated Must The Story Be Told?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63 (2005); Roger L. Zissu, Copyright 
Luncheon Circle: The Interplay Of Copyright And Trademark Law In The Protection Of Character Rights 
With Observations On Dastar V. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 453 
(2004); Mark Bartholomew, Protecting the Performers: Setting a New Standard for Character Copyrighta-
bility, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 341, 347 (2001); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., COPYRIGHT + CHARACTER = 
CATASTROPHE, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 303 (1992); Dean D. Niro, Protecting Characters 
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Some of these uncertainties may not be relevant to the issue of public domain characters. Af-
ter all, once a character passes into the public domain, all aspects of that character pass into the 
public domain. So, whether or not certain aspects of that character might have been protected dur-
ing the copyright term, we need not concern ourselves about this since it will all pass into the 
public domain and be free for use by others. 
At the same time, the uncertain scope of characters becomes an issue when, as already dis-
cussed in the previous section, characters appear in different copyrighted works published at dif-
ferent times. Thus, an early work containing a character may pass into the public domain, while 
later works with that character remain protected. Thus, in this way, the uncertain scope of charac-
ter protection will have an impact on precisely what aspects of that character pass into the public 
domain and at what time. For example, what about fictional events that happen to a character in a 
later work? What about relationships to other characters? What about changes in that character’s 
personality? If these appear in later works still under copyright, can someone reference these as-
pects of the character based on the public domain status of the work in which the character first 
appears?  
Much of this ground has been covered in the previous section, so I will not repeat this analy-
sis, other than to note that only the original, copyrightable aspects of the character would be enti-
tled to protection. As the court did in Silverman, courts will need to look carefully at how charac-
ters have developed over time, and determine what original aspects of a character’s delineation 
are still protected and which have passed into the public domain. There will, thus, be many of the 
same ambiguities referenced in the earlier section, exacerbated somewhat by the additional ambi-
guities surrounding the scope of protection for characters in general. 
To take a concrete example, consider the character Superman, who first appeared in the first 
issue of Action Comics in 1938.
180
 The copyright in that issue is scheduled to expire on January 
1, 2034. When that happens, what aspects of the Superman character will be free for the taking? 
The particular visual depiction of Superman from that comic will be free for others to use. Simi-
larly, the basic elements of Superman’s background (e.g. birth on planet Krypton, sent to Earth by 
his father because Krypton was about to explode, etc.) were established in that issue, so these 
would also pass into the public domain. Similarly, the plot of that initial comic would pass into 
the public domain (i.e. Superman’s alter ego Clark Kent, the nature of his superpowers, his rela-
tionship to Lois Lane, etc.). Thus, a third-party would be able to build upon these elements. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Through Copyright Law: Paving A New Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic, And Motion Picture Charac-
ters Can All Travel, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (1992); E. Fulton Brylawski, Protection of Characters--Sam 
Spade Revisited, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT. SOC'Y. 77, 78 (1974). 
180
 In fact, a similar character appeared earlier in a short illustrated story by the same authors called ―The 
Reign of Super-Man in 1933.‖ However, this early incarnation did not much resemble the version later 
published in 1938. 
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At the same time, the character Superman has undergone significant development in the in-
tervening 80 years. His visual appearance has certainly changed in that time, raising many of the 
same issues discussed above. Perhaps more importantly, much has happened to him in the inter-
vening 80 years. If a third party were to write a new Superman comic book, would that third party 
have to return to the Superman story, as it stood in 1938? Or would this third party be able to ref-
erence some of the significant events that have occurred in that fictional world since then? Would 
readers of this third-party work have to selectively ―forget‖ some of these events, in order to ap-
preciate this new work? Again, courts will need to grapple with whether these new elements were 
sufficiently original to warrant protection and whether the new work infringed upon this originali-
ty. Thus, characters present a special case of the issues raised in the preceding section. 
Indeed, at least one court has already addressed precisely this issue. In Pannonia Farms v. 
U.S.A. Cable,
181
 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed this is-
sue in the context of the characters Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson. As mentioned in the previ-
ous section, many of the early works containing these characters have passed in the public do-
main. However, later works containing these characters are still protected by copyright. In Pan-
nonia, the court held that, even though the Holmes and Watson characters had passed into the 
public domain due to the public domain status of the earlier works, the defendant could not use 
―character traits newly introduced‖ in the still-protected works. This holding puts increased pres-
sure on courts to determine the precise provenance of character traits and whether they are suffi-
ciently original to warrant protection.
182
    
One interesting alternative to carefully tracing the development of characters would be to 
consider an all-or-nothing rule for fictional characters. What if, instead of the careful parsing of 
cumulative originality suggested by the analysis in the preceding section, we adopted a rule that 
said that, once the first work in which a character appears passes into the public domain, that 
character, and all of its attributes, immediately pass into the public domain?
183
 Thus, for example, 
once Mickey Mouse or Superman pass into the public domain, the public is entitled to full use of 
all of the various aspects of those characters, even if they are developed in later works? Although 
those later works would still be protected, they would not prevent a subsequent user from fully 
incorporating all aspects of the character into a new work. 
What would be the benefit of such a view? It would certainly remove much of the uncertainty 
surrounding the precise scope of the public domain character. Third parties wishing to build upon 
these characters would not need to worry as much about tracing the particular source of a fact or 
feature of the character. This would, in turn, greatly expand the ability of third parties to make use 
of characters that have evolved in significant ways over the years. Similarly, consumers would 
not have to contend with the difficulty of ―forgetting‖ subsequent events from later works in or-
der to appreciate these new works. Thus, to the extent we are most concerned about facilitating 
free use of public domain characters, such a blanket rule would certainly encourage these kinds of 
uses. 
There is, admittedly, less doctrinal support for such a result. Conventional copyright analysis 
would require courts to engage in the careful parsing of additional originality, mentioned above. 
And indeed, several courts have in effect rejected such an all-or-nothing rule.
184
 At the same time, 
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 See also Warner Bros. Enter. v. X One X Prod., 644 F.3d 584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011) (reaching similar 
conclusion). 
183
 See Helfand, Mickey Mouse, supra note __, at 655. 
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 See Warner Bros. v. X One X Productions, No. 10-1743 (8th Cir. July 5, 2011) (isolated public domain 
pictures of Dorothy, Scarecrow, and Tin Man were not enough to put the entire characters into the public 
domain); cf. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, 542 F.Supp.2d 1098 (C.D.Cal.2008) (copyright in early, 
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courts could interpret the originality requirement for derivative works in a more searching manner 
when applied to characters. Under such a standard, many of the later changes may not have suffi-
cient additional originality, and thus may reach effectively the same result. Such a result could be 
justified both by the difficulty of tracing changes as well as the benefit to the public. 
Furthermore, copyright owners themselves have in the past made expansive claims of protec-
tion based on copyrighted characters. These claims might have the effect of estopping them from 
now claiming more limited protection. To the extent that copyright owners have argued for a 
broad understanding of what aspects of a character are protected by copyright, such a broad un-
derstanding should also be applied to the question of what passes into the public domain upon 
expiration of the copyright term. 
Thus, in the end, courts will need to carefully consider the precise scope of protection for 
copyrighted characters. 
 
 3. Uncertainty About Public Domain Status 
 
Much of the discussion above has assumed that it is relatively easy to determine whether a 
work is in the public domain, yet that is not always the case. In fact, in some cases, the public 
domain status of a work may be highly contested. Uncertainties about the public domain status of 
a work may considerably restrict the ability of third parties to use or distribute these works with 
confidence. Moreover, copyright owners will have every incentive to exploit uncertainties in or-
der to continue to collect licensing revenues. If these efforts are successful, they will greatly un-
dercut many of the discussed benefits of the new public domain, e.g. free and instantaneous dis-
tribution, re-use and re-casting of iconic works, etc. 
For the works passing into the public domain in the decades immediately after 2018, the pub-
lic domain status of a work will depend on the year of U.S. publication, as the copyright term of 
works created under the 1909 Act is measured from the date of publication. For many works, the 
publication date will be relatively easy to determine, as copies of the work will have been distrib-
uted to the public with a copyright notice, setting forth the date of publication. Thus, for example, 
the public domain status of most literary works will be easy to determine. Similarly, many such 
works will have been registered with the Copyright Office, and thus the publication date will be 
easy to determine from the registration. 
However, for many other works, the publication date will be harder to discern. This is be-
cause ―publication‖ is a term of art under the 1909 Act, and courts have adopted definitions of 
that term that are less than crystal clear. In general, a work is published under the 1909 Act when 
the copyright owner distributes copies of that work to the public in a manner so as to allow the 
public to exercise dominion and control over those copies. By contrast, a limited or more restrict-
ed distribution of copies to a small group may not constitute publication.
185
 Similarly, and per-
haps more importantly, a mere public performance or display of a work, without more, may not 
constitute publication, as it would not involve the distribution of copies to the public.
186
 
As a result, for works that were distributed only in a limited fashion or that were merely per-
formed or displayed, the date of publication may be ambiguous. Thus, for example, it may be 
more difficult to determine precisely when a particular piece of music was ―published,‖ if it was 
primarily performed over radio broadcasts, and if copies of the music were not widely available 
                                                                                                                                                 
black and white depictions of a Superman-like character not enough to give rise to rights over later, more 
fully-developed character). 
185
 See, e.g., Academy of Motion Pictures Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, 944 (f.2d 1446 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
186
 See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).   
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to the public, without restrictions.
187
 Similarly, the publication date of a work of fine art may be 
difficult to discern, if the copyright owner has only displayed the work in public, but not distrib-
uted or authorized copies to be distributed to the public at large. Uncertainty over the publication 
date can thus result in significant uncertainty over the public domain status of a work. And in-
deed, a number of important works have been subject to precisely these kinds of disputes.
188
 
Robert Brauneis has recently highlighted an example of just this kind of uncertainty regarding 
―the world’s most famous song,‖ Happy Birthday.189 Brauneis undertakes a detailed and painstak-
ing historical analysis of the origins of the song and the subsequent claims of ownership of the 
copyright. His analysis highlights many of the uncertainties that can often attend any attempt to 
specifically pin down who wrote a particular work (in this case, both the lyrics and the tune), 
when it was written, when it was published, and what happened to the copyright afterwards. 
Nearly all of these uncertainties can be found in the history of Happy Birthday. And indeed, 
Brauneis ultimately concludes that the work is probably in the public domain, despite the fact that 
the alleged owners of the copyright (a subsidiary of AOL/Time Warner) continue to collect ap-
proximately $2 million in annual revenues based on licensing of the song.  
We can expect many of these uncertainties to exist for other works as well, not just Happy 
Birthday. Given the length of the current copyright term, the copyright status of works will de-
pend on events and facts that happened nearly 100 years ago. Because there may be poor records 
and imperfect memories, we can expect a good deal of legal uncertainty surrounding the specific 
publication date for some works and, therefore, the specific date upon which a work enters the 
public domain. This is particularly true for works that were not widely distributed to the public or 
that were only performed. 
In a related fashion, parties may attempt to lay claim to ostensibly public domain works by 
making small changes to a public domain work in an effort to retain or extend copyright, and us-
ing the resultant uncertainty to limit free use. For example, Paul Heald has documented this phe-
nomenon in the specific case of choral music.
190
 Much choral music is in the public domain. Mu-
sic publishers, however, routinely distribute and sell public domain choral music with a copyright 
notice, claiming an existing copyright. These claims are based on relatively minor changes to the 
arrangements of the particular public domain choral pieces, e.g. fingering suggestions, dynamics, 
etc. Similar claims could be made for any public domain work, for example by distributing a ver-
sion with minimal changes and a new copyright notice. 
In theory, this should not pose too much of a problem, since the original, unaltered works are 
in the public domain, and a party wishing to use the work could look for the original instead of 
relying upon the changed version. In practice, however, this kind of aggressive copyright labeling 
can have a chilling effect on free use, as it is not entirely clear to most users (who do not follow 
the details of copyright law) what, precisely is and is not in the public domain. In the context of 
public domain choral music, Heald carefully documents the ways in which ambiguity about the 
precise scope of public domain versus copyrighted material can affect the behavior of choir direc-
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 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hall, Blues And The Public Domain--No More Dues To Pay?, 42 J. COPYRIGHT 
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tors.
191
 Similarly, ambiguity about what is in the public domain may have a similar chilling effect 
on others.
192
 This is a particular concern to the extent we expect the range of potential users of 
public domain works to expand in light of new changes in technology. 
To some extent, some of this uncertainty may be unavoidable, and both parties and courts 
will have to determine precisely when a given work was ―published‖ under the 1909 Act, when 
additional modifications are sufficiently original to give rise to a new copyright, etc. At the same 
time, the Copyright Office and the Library of Congress can play an important administrative role 
in facilitating knowledge and use of new public domain works. Certainly, it would be immensely 
useful to have a published registry of works that will pass into the public domain as of certain 
dates.
193
 This would greatly reduce the uncertainty that third parties might face over the public 
domain status of a work. This would also allow third parties to prepare for works passing into the 
public domain (much as companies in many industries prepare for inventions to go off-patent). 
Together, these kinds of administrative steps could help third parties make the most use of works 
passing into the public domain.
194
 Such steps are also consistent with the Copyright Office’s goal 
of serving as a repository of legal claims.
195
 
In addition, some regulation of unreasonably aggressive copyright claims over public domain 
works might be appropriate. Federal law does impose certain criminal penalties for fraudulent 
copyright notices.
196
 However, such sanctions are relatively modest, dependent upon the govern-
ment for enforcement, and limited to copyright notice, not other kinds of expansive claims. Jason 
Mazzone has suggested that copyright owners should face greater sanctions for fraudulent copy-
right claims.
197
 Some claims of copyright ownership over clearly public domain works might rise 
to the standard of fraud, and thus warrant similar treatment under Mazzone’s proposal. Alterna-
tively, we could imagine a rule that required parties claiming copyright over minimally-altered 
public domain works to clearly identify what additional original elements are being claimed, or 
clearly disclaiming the elements that are in the public domain (as in the case of U.S. government 
works.) 
Thus, in the end, a number of administrative steps can be taken to minimize uncertainty over 
the public domain status of specific works. By reducing this uncertainty, these steps can ensure 
maximum realization of the benefits of the new public domain. 
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 4. Anticircumvention Liability 
 
Finally, former copyright owners may be able to limit the practical ability to use public do-
main works through technical measures backed by anticircumvention liability.
198
 In the same year 
that Congress extended the copyright term, Congress also passed the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act of 1998, which created a new cause of action directed against circumvention of techno-
logical measures used to control access to copyrighted works.
199
 Thus, for example, circumvent-
ing the encryption of a movie on a DVD would lead to liability under the DMCA. In addition, 
trafficking in technologies that facilitated this kind of circumvention would also lead to liability. 
Owners of expired copyrights may be able to limit widespread use of works through the 
DMCA by distributing public domain works bundled with copyrighted content and then protect-
ing these works using technological measures. A third party wishing to use the public domain 
content could circumvent the technological protection measure, but could conceivably be liable 
under the DMCA, since he would have obtained access not only to the public domain work, but 
also the bundled copyrighted content. 
To take a concrete example, the film Gone With the Wind is expected to pass into the public 
domain in 2035. Imagine that, after that date, someone wishes to incorporate significant portions 
of that movie into their own work. If that person purchases a DVD of Gone With the Wind, she 
will need to circumvent the access control technology in order to copy the public domain work. 
However, that work is very likely bundled with work that is still protected by copyright (e.g. di-
rector commentary, later-created documentaries about the making of the film, etc.). Thus, an act 
of circumvention may give rise to potential liability under the DMCA. 
To some extent, this is not an absolute limit on third-party use, but rather a limit on how easy 
it is to access such works. It would still be possible to access copies that are not subject to such 
protection (for example, copies of Gone With the Wind on videotape). At the same time, this kind 
of liability imposes a practical hurdle, particularly for works for which there are not many copies 
in widespread circulation. Moreover, it does so without good reason, since the underlying works 
are clearly in the public domain. If we want these works to be widely and freely available, then 
attention should be paid to the practical availability of such works for copying and re-use. 
One possible response would be to interpret DMCA liability with an eye toward copyright 
policy. Some federal courts have limited the reach of the DMCA, applying it only to cases where 
the act of circumvention implicates a copyright interest.
200
 Thus, circumvention that does not 
meaningfully raise a copyright interest falls outside the scope of the DMCA. Under such a view, 
circumventing a technological protection measure to gain access to a public domain work might 
not lead to DMCA liability. Other federal courts, however, have rejected this standard, arguing 
that it is at odds with the language of the DMCA, which contains no such qualification.
201
 Even 
under the more relaxed standard, the kind of access discussed above does not resemble the kind 
of completely unrelated access at issue in those cases. 
An alternative would be for the Librarian of Congress to exempt acts of circumvention de-
signed to gain access to public domain works. The DMCA authorizes the Librarian of Congress 
to exempt categories of works from DMCA liability, if such liability hinders legitimate access to 
such works.
202
 Public domain works protected by access control technologies would appear to 
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qualify for an exemption. Moreover, such an exemption would remove one possible obstacle 
standing in the way of more widespread access to public domain works.
203
 
Finally, the Library of Congress could play a very important role in ensuring easy digital ac-
cess to works that have passed into the public domain by, for example, maintaining a publicly 
accessible repository of digital copies of works that have passed into the public domain. Indeed, 
the Library of Congress already makes many of the public domain works in its collection availa-
ble over the Internet. Continuing to do this with recently-expired works would obviate many con-
cerns about the practical access to public domain works, particularly in cases where former copy-
right owners attempt to restrict use through technological means or through misleading claims of 
copyright protection.
204
 
 
* * * 
 
Thus, in the end, although there are many potential obstacles facing the new public domain, 
courts are equipped with the tools to ensure that these obstacles do not stand in the way of a more 
robust and effective public domain. Some of these tools can be found within the doctrinal frame-
works of trademark law and copyright law. These tools can and should be supplemented with a 
clear understanding of the important role and preemptive scope of copyright law’s public domain. 
In addition, the Copyright Office and Library of Congress can take concrete steps to ensure that 
knowledge about, and access to, public domain works remains widespread and robust. Together, 
these steps can ensure that the new public domain will play a more vital and important role in the 
copyright balance than ever before. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has argued that, after 2019, the potential exists for an invigorated and vital new 
public domain to play an important and immediate role in our cultural landscape and in setting the 
overall balance in copyright law going forward. Although a number of potential obstacles stand in 
the way, careful attention by the courts and the Copyright Office to the important role of the pub-
lic domain can ensure that this new public domain lives up to its promise.  
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